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The Misinterpretation of eBay 
v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of the 
Case History, Precedent, and Parties 
Ryan T. Holte* 
ABSTRACT 
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) is approaching a decade of 
citation and, in that time, the landscape for injunctions in patent infringement 
cases has changed dramatically. Can revisiting the case give us a better 
understanding of how the standards for injunctions should be understood 
post-eBay, perhaps in contrast to how they are understood? The purpose of this 
article is to extract that detail regarding the eBay injunction denial from 
primary sources. This research focuses solely on the injunction issue post-trial 
to case settlement. The article next assesses the impact of eBay on district 
courts, inventors, news stories, intellectual property investors, and others over 
the last decade. Finally, based in part on a review of court opinions considering 
permanent injunctions since eBay, and court citations to eBay’s concurring 
opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, the article argues that 
the case has largely been misinterpreted by district courts and others for 
various reasons including: improper reliance on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence; 
misleading media coverage; eBay’s public relations efforts to spin media 
attention in its favor; a district court judge generally biased against patent 
owners and uniquely concerned with the wide disparities between the parties, 
the motives of MercExchange, and the vast consequences an injunction may 
bring against the world’s largest auction marketplace; and the fact that the case 
settled after the district court’s second denial of an injunction but before the 
Federal Circuit could revisit the issues. The article concludes by emphasizing 
that eBay should be cited for what the Court actually held, and not for how the 
case has been (mis)interpreted these last ten years. 
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Greg Stillman, John Whealan, and Tom Woolston. Finally, many thanks to my wife 
Jessica for her support and comments and Michael Morthland for the excellent research 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the landmark Supreme Court decision, eBay 
v. MercExchange,1 the Court changed the standards for granting 
permanent injunctions in patent cases. The opinion dramatically 
altered the landscape of patent litigation,2 ending the practice of 
near-automatic granting of injunctions to successful patent 
owners.3 There have been voluminous writings about all aspects 
of the eBay decision, but the particular details of the case and its 
procedural posture before the Supreme Court have gone largely 
unexplored by commentators and lawyers. It is important to ask 
whether the eBay Court’s radical change to remedies law in 
 
 1 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 2 DOUGLAS C. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 427 
(4th ed. 2010) (“By early May 2010 [only four years after the opinion was issued], eBay 
had been cited more than 4,100 times. Before eBay, courts presumed irreparable injury in 
intellectual property cases on the ground that damages in such cases are notoriously 
difficult to measure. Now courts are split on whether any such presumption is 
permissible.”); Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The 
Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205 (2012) (“U.S. law has, it 
seems, entered a new world of injunctive relief in which the . . . language of eBay is 
king.”); see also id. at 206 (noting the far-reaching eBay case impact to control even the 
United States national healthcare reform act enforceability, and detailing how the 
“government argued that a district court’s declaratory judgment that the act is 
unconstitutional should not be deemed immediately effective without a holding that the 
eBay test was satisfied”). 
 3 See infra Part III. A sampling of district court permanent injunction decisions 
between May 2003 and May 2005, just prior to eBay, revealed between 94% and 100% of 
patentee motions for injunctions granted. In the most recent and comprehensive study of 
the 217 district court permanent injunction decisions post-eBay, Professor Chris Seaman 
finds permanent injunctions were granted in only 72.8% of cases where the parties 
contested the issue. Where parties were not market competitors, injunctions were granted 
in only 21.6% of cases (8 of 37 cases), and where the patentee was an NPE, injunctions 
were granted in only 16.0% of cases (4 of 25 cases)—a 78% to 84% drop post-eBay. Id. 
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patent jurisprudence was effected, at least in part, by the 
litigation details.4 
This Article fills the gap in the scholarship by asking some 
simple, yet heretofore unanswered, questions about the eBay case 
itself. Was there something in particular about the patent owner, 
MercExchange, or the litigation that led the Court to break with 
past practice? Can revisiting the case and its great impact give 
us a better understanding of how the standards for injunctions 
should be understood post-eBay, perhaps in contrast to how they 
are understood? After scrutinizing the primary sources, this 
Article provides what may appear to many patent lawyers and 
commentators to be surprising answers. In sum, a close analysis 
of the case records reveals that lawyers, judges, and academics 
have read eBay incorrectly, which has resulted in an improper 
post-eBay change in law governing how injunctions should be 
issued against infringers of patents.  
The purpose of this Article is to answer the questions posed 
above. While much has been written about the likelihood of 
obtaining an injunction in patent litigation post-eBay, little 
attention has been given to what may have made the case, 
parties, or inventions at issue so unique that they became the 
basis for the Supreme Court’s complete revision of equitable 
remedies doctrine in patent law.5 In the words of MercExchange’s 
former lead counsel, “Justice is made by the litigants of a 
particular case and what they consider to be a reasonable 
result.”6 Some attention to the particular facts of this case proves 
 
 4 These questions were prompted by an earlier article by the author. That article 
presented a case study of MercExchange, L.L.C., a patent assertion entity (“PAE”), as it 
rose to prominence from an inventive startup, to litigant against eBay, and finally to 
subject of a landmark United States Supreme Court decision. That article described 
inventors represented by PAEs and the stories behind their patents; however, 
commentators expressed interest in learning more about the injunction issue in 
MercExchange’s famous appeal. See generally Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great 
Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2014). 
 5 See Susan Decker & Oliver Staley, EBay Agrees to Settle ‘Buy It Now’ Patent 
Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2008, 4:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aoOIDXjUOi8A (“EBay Inc. . . . agreed to end a lawsuit over its 
‘Buy It Now’ sales option in a case that reversed an almost 100-year-old precedent in U.S. 
patent law . . . . Before the Supreme Court’s EBay ruling in May 2006, patent owners 
almost always received orders to block products. Since then, judges throughout the U.S. 
have denied such orders in cases where the patent owner is not a competitor of the 
company making the infringing products.”); see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The 
Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent 
Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631, 632 (2007) (“However, in 
2006 in eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court overruled its longstanding precedent. 
Although a patent owner, pursuant to statutory patent law, is entitled to monetary 
damages for patent infringement, he or she is not entitled to permanent injunctive 
relief.”).  
 6 Interview with Greg Stillman, Partner, Hunton Williams (July 15, 2014). 
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illuminating, as a previous article has shown in a case study of 
MercExchange as an alleged “patent assertion entity.”7  
This Article presents an in-depth case study of eBay with a 
focus on the injunction issue as it developed from post-trial to 
case settlement. Most people are aware of the basic “case brief” 
details of eBay, such as the denial of a permanent injunction 
after a jury found eBay to have willfully infringed 
MercExchange’s patent,8 but this Article explores more deeply 
what happened in this case by considering the following 
questions: first, were the facts of the case sufficiently different 
from previous cases to encourage the Supreme Court to reverse 
the Federal Circuit’s practice of issuing injunctions virtually 
automatically based on findings of patent infringement; second, 
what were the facts and circumstances motivating the district 
court’s initial denial of an injunction, and later the Supreme 
Court’s review of the injunction as well; and third, what were the 
details of the eventual settlement of the dispute prior to 
resolution of MercExchange’s second appeal to the Federal 
Circuit. It answers these questions by closely examining the 
primary sources to piece together the full story, including the 
records regarding the denial of the injunction, court transcripts, 
court dockets, and interviews with the parties and counsel 
involved. 
This Article reviews the history of eBay and explains how 
and why this hugely important Supreme Court decision has been 
widely misunderstood in recent years. Part I provides the 
background on the case prior to reaching the Supreme Court, 
detailing the actual dispute between MercExchange and eBay, 
the jury’s findings of infringement, the district court’s denial of 
an injunction, and the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the district 
court’s decision. Part I then goes on to discuss the briefing and 
proceedings before the Supreme Court and resulting May 2006 
opinion remanding the case to the district court with two 
separate concurrences by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy. Part II reviews the case proceedings after the Supreme 
Court remand to the Eastern District of Virginia, which denied 
MercExchange an injunction against eBay for a second time, 
followed by further appellate proceedings at the Federal Circuit 
 
 7 Holte, supra note 4, at 1. 
 8 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559–60 (E.D. Va. 2007) 
(“On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award for the ’265 patent, reversed 
the ’176 damages, finding such patent invalid based upon obviousness . . . .” (citing 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); see also id. at 560 
(“Accordingly, the [Supreme] Court ordered that the ’265 injunction dispute be remanded 
to [the district] court . . . .”). 
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before the case finally settled in February 2008. Part III reviews 
what eBay v. MercExchange has come to mean to district courts, 
the Federal Circuit, inventors, the media, intellectual property 
investors, and others in the decade since the Supreme Court’s 
opinion. This includes discussion of how injunction grants have 
gone from pre-eBay rates of 94%–100% to post-eBay rates of 73% 
for all patent owners and 16% for patentees that do not practice 
the patents they own.9 Part III further includes how courts are 
routinely using Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as the law in 
analyzing patent injunctions and how the public perception of 
patent infringement post-eBay is that injunctions are no longer 
allowed for non-practicing patentees. Finally, Part IV contrasts 
the application of the new injunction standard, described in Part 
III, with what the unanimous eBay opinion actually held. Based 
in part on surveys of how courts and others have understood the 
new injunction standards, as well as the detailed analysis of the 
eBay case record, this Article concludes that eBay has been 
misinterpreted by trial courts and others for a variety of reasons. 
These reasons include: courts improperly following Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence as precedent; incorrect media attention 
on the case; eBay’s marketing and public relations efforts to spin 
media attention in its favor; the district court judge being 
generally biased against patent owners and uniquely concerned 
with the wide disparities between the parties, the motives of 
MercExchange, and the vast consequences an injunction may 
bring against the world’s largest auction marketplace; and case 
settlement timing depriving the Federal Circuit of ruling on the 
case after the district court’s second denial of an injunction on 
remand. This Article concludes by exploring what parties have 
won and lost in the eBay confusion and emphasizes that the eBay 
opinion should be cited for what it actually holds, not how it has 
been misinterpreted. As stated recently by a district court 
denying a motion to stay an injunction and emphasizing the 
importance of equitable remedy options for patent holders: 
[while] less well-remembered than its criticism of the Federal Circuit, 
eBay’s criticism of the district court[] . . . was just as 
pronounced . . . . [W]hether for Thomas Edison and his light bulb 
patents or [a patent holder today] and its off-the-shelf purchase, the 
exclusive rights under 35 U.S.C. § 271 are the same; that period of 
exclusivity never comes back.10  
 
 9 See infra Part III. 
 10 Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., v. Tek Global, S.R.L., No. 5:11-cv-00774-PSG, 2014 LEXIS 
146443, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2014) (emphasis added) (order denying motion to stay 
injunction, denying motion to extend injunction sunset period, and granting motion to 
modestly modify injunction).  
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I. EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE BEFORE AND AT THE SUPREME COURT 
A.  eBay v. MercExchange at the District Court—Trial and 
Initial Permanent Injunction Request Denied 
The dispute between eBay and MercExchange began in 2001 
after communications between the parties regarding the sale of 
MercExchange’s patents broke down.11 MercExchange filed suit 
against eBay for patent infringement on September 26, 2001, in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.12 The 
three patents asserted by MercExchange, U.S. Patent Nos. 
5,845,265 (“the ’265 patent”), 6,086,176 (“the ’176 patent”), and 
6,202,051 (“the ’051 patent”), all related to business methods for 
trusted Internet sales of used goods (eBay’s “Buy It Now” 
feature).13 Before trial, the district court judge, Jerome B. 
Friedman, granted summary judgment in favor of eBay on the 
’051 patent, finding it invalid for lack of written description.14 
Accordingly, trial proceeded on MercExchange’s ’265 and ’176 
patents. 
The five-week jury trial concluded on May 27, 2003.15 
[The] jury found that eBay had willfully infringed [12] claims . . . of 
the ’265 patent and had induced [a co-defendant] to infringe [4] 
claims . . . of the ’265 patent; that [another co-defendant subsidiary of 
eBay]16 had willfully infringed [12] claims . . . of the ’265 patent and 
[12] claims . . . of the ’176 patent; and that neither the ’265 patent nor 
the ’176 patent was invalid.17  
Concerning damages, the jury found eBay and its subsidiary 
liable for $29.5 million.18 
 
 11 Holte, supra note 4, at 29.  
 12 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 547 U.S. 388 
(2006). The original suit was filed against eBay, Half.com, and ReturnBuy. Half.com is a 
subsidiary of eBay, and prior to trial ReturnBuy filed for bankruptcy and entered into a 
settlement agreement with MercExchange. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 
1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (“Prior to [the 
district court] trial, ReturnBuy filed for bankruptcy and entered into a settlement 
agreement with MercExchange.”).  
 13 Gregory d’Incelli, Has eBay Spelled the End of Patent Troll Abuses? Paying the 
Toll: The Rise (And Fall?) of the Patent Troll, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 343, 353 (2009) 
(“The eBay case involved a claim by MercExchange—the owner of a business method 
patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate sale of goods among private 
citizens—that eBay was violating its patent.”). 
 14 MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 15 Holte, supra note 4, at 29.  
 16 Tim Eaton, EBay Acquires Half.com, CBSMARKETWATCH.COM (June 13, 2000, 
8:00 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ebay-buys-halfcom (“EBay said Tuesday it 
will buy Half.com for up to $374 million in stock, adding a fixed-price service to the online 
auctioneer’s business.”). 
 17 MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1326. 
 18 Id. The jury found eBay liable for $10.5 million for their infringement and 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 11:45 AM 
684 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
After trial, Judge Friedman decided ten post-trial motions 
and described the case as “one of the more, if not the most, 
contentious cases that [his] court [had] ever presided over.”19 
Included in those motions, and the focus of this Article, was 
MercExchange’s Motion for Entry of a Permanent Injunction 
Order.20 In its “Brief in Support of Motion for Entry of a 
Permanent Injunction Order,” citing numerous Federal Circuit 
decisions, MercExchange asserted “permanent injunctions are 
typically entered after a patent owner prevails on the merits.”21 
MercExchange went on to say:  
The injunction creates a property right and leads to negotiations 
between the parties. A private outcome of these negotiations - whether 
they end in a license at a particular royalty or in the exclusion of an 
infringer from the market - is much preferable to a judicial 
guesstimate about what a royalty should be. The actual market beats 
judicial attempts to mimic the market every time, making injunctions 
the normal and preferred remedy. . . . In fact, it would be contrary to 
the maxims of property law to deny MercExchange its fundamental 
and statutory right to exclude now that the infringement has been 
adjudged.22 
MercExchange further cited a District of New Jersey case 
that listed the four equitable factors courts should consider 
before issuing an injunction23 and generally discussed each factor 
 
$5.5 million for inducing ReturnBuy to infringe the patent. The jury also held Half.com 
liable for $19 million for infringement, totaling $35 million for willfully infringing the 
plaintiff’s patents. However, following the verdict, eBay moved to set aside the 
$5.5 million award for inducing ReturnBuy to infringe the patent. The district court 
granted eBay’s motion to set aside the damages award for inducement of infringement. Id. 
 19 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 547 
U.S. 388 (2006). 
 20 Plaintiff MercExchange, L.L.C.’s Brief in Support of Motion for Entry of a 
Permanent Injunction Order, in III Joint Appendix at 927, 927, eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 236431, at *927. 
 21 Id. at 932, 936 (“Based on the jury’s verdict of infringement, it is presumed that 
the continued infringement causes MercExchange irreparable harm. . . . ‘In matters 
involving patent rights, irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear showing has 
been made of patent validity and infringement.’. . . ‘[T]his presumption derives in part 
from the finite term of the patent grant, for patent expiration is not suspended during 
litigation, and the passage of time can work irremediable harm.’” (quoting Richardson v. 
Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); see also id. at 932 
(“Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the 
patent law partakes, to deny the patentee’s right to exclude others from use of his 
property . . . It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has 
been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.” (citing Richardson, 868 F.2d at 
1246–47)). 
 22 Id. at 933. 
 23 Id. at 934 (“The Boehringer court stated that it should consider the equities 
of: (1) whether the patentee would be irreparably harmed without an injunction; 
(2) whether the patentee had an adequate remedy at law; (3) whether granting the 
injunction was in the public interest; and (4) whether the balance of hardships favored an 
injunction.” (citing Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 106 
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as it related to the parties and case.24 Finally, regarding the case 
equities, MercExchange noted that “representatives of eBay have 
already stated that the trial was only ‘Round One’ of an ongoing 
battle in an attempt to overwhelm the substantially smaller and 
under-funded MercExchange.”25  
In response, eBay’s district court opposition brief cited three 
reasons why MercExchange’s request for injunction was 
inappropriate. First, eBay argued that “MercExchange’s 
proposed injunction [was] vague and overly broad, [and] 
impermissibly seeks to restrain lawful-and 
non-infringing-activity.”26 Second, eBay contended that 
“MercExchange’s proposed injunction fails to provide sufficient 
guidance for design-around and contempt purposes . . . which 
would bury the Court with computer source code, engineering 
documents, and claim charts for over a decade.”27 Finally, eBay 
disagreed with MercExchange’s assertions that an injunction was 
“automatic,” disagreed that the equities weighed in favor of 
issuing an injunction, and argued that “MercExchange can be 
adequately compensated by damages.”28  
Regarding the equities of an injunction, eBay cited an 
Eastern District of Virginia case requiring the four traditional 
equitable principles to be considered.29 Regarding the first 
equitable factor, whether MercExchange would be irreparably 
harmed, eBay argued that the infringement was more than a 
“close call”30 and listed four points. First, eBay asserted that it 
did “not practice any claims of the #265 and #176 patents, or 
 
F. Supp. 2d 696, 700–01 (D. N.J. 2000))). 
 24  Id. at 935–40. 
 25 Id. at 938 (“Moreover, post-verdict conduct by eBay and Half.com demonstrates 
that the infringement continues unabated. In fact, representatives of eBay have already 
stated that the trial was only ‘Round One’ of an ongoing battle in an attempt to 
overwhelm the substantially smaller and under-funded MercExchange. Without an 
injunction, defendants' efforts may ultimately exhaust MercExchange's resources, thus 
permitting it to prevail notwithstanding its wanton and willful infringement of 
MercExchange's property rights.”). 
 26 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff MercExchange, L.L.C.’s Brief in Support of 
Motion for Entry of a Permanent Injunction Order, in III Joint Appendix at 982, 988, 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 236431, at 
*988. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 989. 
 29 Id. at 1009 (“The Court should not, however, merely rubber-stamp the jury’s 
verdict with an injunction, as MercExchange suggests. The Court must instead consider 
and weigh the equities of the case, including: (1) whether MercExchange would be 
inseparably [sic] harmed if the injunction does not issue; (2) whether MercExchange has 
an adequate remedy at law; (3) whether granting the injunction is in the public interest; 
and (4) whether the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiffs’ favor.” (citing Odetics, Inc. 
v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794–97 (E.D. Va. 1998))). 
 30 Id. at 1011. 
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encourage any one else to do so.”31 eBay maintained “an 
injunction would be inappropriate because there will be no threat 
of future infringement.”32 Second, eBay argued “the evidence 
from trial was clear that MercExchange is willing to license or 
sell its patents, such that it can be adequately compensated for 
any allegedly continuing use. Such licenses weigh against, and in 
fact rebut, any irreparable harm . . . .”33 Third, eBay noted media 
comments from MercExchange’s inventor, Tom Woolston, stating, 
“[I]t is not our goal to enforce these patents, we want to sell off 
our Intellectual Property rights,”34 and MercExchange’s counsel’s 
statement, “It’s not our goal to put eBay out of business. It’s our 
goal to provide just compensation for the patent owner.”35 Lastly, 
eBay asserted the evidence at trial made clear MercExchange’s 
inventor “utterly failed at all attempts to commercialize and 
build his alleged inventions, and the only benefit his company 
receives from the patents-in-suit is licensing revenue.”36 
Judge Friedman issued his order and opinion denying 
MercExchange’s permanent injunction request on August 6, 
2003.37 Judge Friedman acknowledged “the grant of injunctive 
relief against the infringer is considered the norm”; however, 
issuance of an injunction is governed by “traditional equitable 
principles.”38 Judge Friedman then went through discussion of 
the four equitable factors noted in both MercExchange and 
eBay’s briefs. 
Regarding the first factor, whether MercExchange would 
face irreparable injury if an injunction did not issue, Judge 
Friedman noted a “clear showing of [patent] validity and 
 
 31 Id. at 1013. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. at 1014 (citation omitted); Ina Steiner, eBay-Contested MercExchange Patents 
Are on the Block, ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM (May 30, 2003), http://www.ecommerce 
bytes.com/cab/abn/y03/m05/i30/s01 (“When asked if he would go after small niche sites in 
the auction industry, Woolston said, ‘it is not our goal to enforce these patents, we want to 
sell off our Intellectual Property rights.’”). 
 35 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff MercExchange, L.L.C.’s Brief in Support of 
Motion for Entry of a Permanent Injunction Order, supra note 2620, at 1014 (“We are 
seeking reasonable royalties as permitted under the patent laws,’ Robertson said. ‘It’s not 
our goal to put eBay out of business. It’s our goal to provide just compensation for the 
patent owner.” (quoting Troy Wolverton, Patent Suit Could Sting eBay, CNET (Sept. 5, 
2002, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Patent-suit-could-sting-eBay/2100-1017_3-9566 
38.html)). 
 36 Id. at 1015. 
 37 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 547 U.S. 388 
(2006).  
 38 Id. at 711 (citing Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 
(E.D. Va. 1998)). 
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infringement has been met,” but that “merely establishes a 
presumption of irreparable harm.”39 He went on, stating: 
[T]he evidence of [MercExchange’s] willingness to license its patents, 
its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its 
comments to the media as to its intent with respect to enforcement of 
its patent rights, are sufficient to rebut the presumption that it will 
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.40  
He went on to note MercExchange never motioned for a 
preliminary injunction, which “lends additional weight in support 
of [eBay’s] arguments that [MercExchange] will not be 
irreparably harmed absent an injunction.”41 
Regarding the second factor, adequate remedy at law, Judge 
Friedman stated that MercExchange “has licensed its patents to 
others in the past and has indicated its willingness to license the 
patents to [eBay] in this case.”42 He noted the court was aware 
“monetary damages are typically inadequate because it limits the 
patent holder from exercising its monopoly power” but that this 
particular dispute “[was] certainly an atypical case.”43  
Regarding the third factor, public interest, Judge Friedman 
discussed how the public’s interest in maintaining the integrity 
of the patent system favors enjoining an infringer’s activities, but 
stated: “[I]n this case[,] where the patentee does not practice its 
patents, nor has any intention of practicing its patents[,] . . . the 
public does not benefit from a patentee who obtains a patent yet 
declines to allow the public to benefit from the inventions 
contained therein.”44 He further noted “there is a growing 
concern over the issuance of business-method patents.”45 
Finally, regarding the fourth equitable factor, balance of the 
hardships, Judge Friedman reasoned that “[w]hile it is important 
to respect the rights of the patent holder, in this case, the 
plaintiff exists solely to license its patents or sue to enforce its 
patents, and not to develop or commercialize them.”46 Before 
denying MercExchange’s injunction request, he concluded: “If the 
court did enjoin [eBay], the court would essentially be opening a 
Pandora’s box of new problems. . . . The court envisions contempt 
 
 39 Id. at 711–12. 
 40 Id. at 712. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 712–13. 
 43 Id. at 713. 
 44 Id. at 713–14. For a brief discussion of the error in this portion of the district 
court’s holding, see Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District 
Courts Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 68 
(2007). 
 45 MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 713. 
 46 Id. at 714. 
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hearing after contempt hearing requiring the court to essentially 
conduct separate infringement trials . . . [at] extraordinary costs 
to the parties, as well as considerable judicial resources.”47 
B. eBay v. MercExchange at the Federal Circuit—Initial 
Appeal; Reverse and Remand of the District Court Injunction 
Denial 
Both MercExchange and eBay appealed to the Federal 
Circuit on various grounds. The Federal Circuit issued a 
seventeen-page opinion on March 16, 2005, addressing the 
injunction issue for just over one page.48 In reversing the denial 
of a permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit did not cite the 
four-factor equitable test. Instead, the court began its analysis by 
stating: “[T]he general rule is that a permanent injunction will 
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged,”49 but 
“a court may decline to enter an injunction when ‘a patentee’s 
failure to practice the patented invention frustrates an important 
public need for the invention,’ such as . . . to protect public 
health.”50 The court went on to find error with the district court 
opinion in four fundamental areas. 
First, regarding Judge Friedman’s concern over the issuance 
of business-method patents, the Federal Circuit stated, 
“A general concern regarding business-method patents . . . is not 
the type of important public need that justifies the unusual step 
of denying injunctive relief.”51 Second, regarding Judge 
Friedman’s concerns over multiple future contempt hearings 
requiring separate infringement trials if an injunction issued, the 
Federal Circuit stated, “A continuing dispute of that sort is not 
unusual in a patent case,” but “[this] is not a sufficient basis for 
denying a permanent injunction.”52 The court went on to note 
that even in the absence of an injunction, such disputes would be 
likely to continue if MercExchange believed eBay continued to 
violate its patent rights.53  
Third, regarding the district court’s discussion of 
MercExchange’s public statements describing willingness to 
license the patents at issue, the Federal Circuit stated, 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and 
remanded, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 49  Id. at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 
(Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 50 Id. (quoting Rite–Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 51 Id. at 1339. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 11:45 AM 
2015] The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange 689 
“Injunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice 
their patents,” and “[i]f the injunction gives [MercExchange] 
additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of 
the right to exclude.”54 Lastly, regarding Judge Friedman’s 
conclusions that MercExchange’s lack of moving for 
a  preliminary injunction weighed against future rights to a 
permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit stated that a 
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary relief available on 
a  special showing of pre-litigation need serving an “entirely 
different purpose[]” than a permanent injunction.55 The Federal 
Circuit concluded its discussion of the injunction issue 
holding: “We therefore see no reason to depart from the general 
rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”56 
There were two additional holdings worthy of note regarding 
the Federal Circuit opinion. First, the Court reversed the district 
court’s summary judgment finding in favor of eBay on the ’051 
patent, vacating the district court’s findings of invalidity and 
remanding for further proceedings.57 Second, the Federal Circuit 
held MercExchange’s ’176 patent claims invalid as anticipated.58 
The ’176 portion of the damages were $4.5 million.59 
Interestingly, on the day the Federal Circuit opinion was 
published—March 16, 2005—eBay issued a press release stating: 
eBay is pleased with today’s decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
that invalidates one of MercExchange’s patents, and as a result, 
throws out all the related damages. Looking forward, we believe that 
any injunction that might be issued by the District Court with respect 
to the other patent will not have an impact on our business because of 
changes we have made following the District Court’s original verdict. 
The press release concluded by stating, “We are confident in our 
position against MercExchange and do not believe that these 
matters will have any impact on our business.”60  
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. (quoting Lermer Ger. GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1337.  
 58 Id. at 1335 (discussing the ’176 patent to be invalid as it was enabled and found 
that a previous article disclosed each limitation of the asserted claims of the ’176 patent, 
“and for that reason [the court held] those claims are anticipated”). 
 59 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(“Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of 
$29.5 million. This consists of . . . $4.5 million for . . . direct infringement of the ’176 
patent.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and 
remanded, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 60 Press Release, eBay, eBay Statement on U.S. Court of Appeals Ruling in 
MercExchange Case (Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/ 
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On April 29, 2005, three days after the Federal Circuit 
denied eBay’s request for en banc rehearing, eBay petitioned the 
Federal Circuit for a stay of its mandate pending a planned writ 
of certiorari to the Supreme Court.61 Within that pleading, eBay 
stated that staying the mandate “is necessary to prevent 
irreparable harm to eBay.”62 The Federal Circuit granted the 
stay of the mandate on May 11, 2005, without opinion.63 On May 
13, 2005, eBay issued a press release stating: “In granting eBay’s 
petition to stay the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals considered 
whether there was both a reasonable probability that the 
Supreme Court would accept eBay’s appeal and a fair prospect 
that the majority of the Supreme Court would reverse one or 
more rulings against eBay.”64 
C.  eBay v. MercExchange at the Supreme Court—Reversal of 
the Federal Circuit and District Court 
eBay filed its petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme 
Court on July 25, 2005.65 MercExchange filed its opposition on 
September 26, 2005; six amici curiae briefs regarding the petition 
for certiorari were also filed by that date.66 On November 28, 
2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions.67 
First, the question presented by eBay—whether the Federal 
Circuit erred in employing the general rule of issuing a 
permanent injunction after a finding of infringement. Second, 
 
home/20050316005875/en/eBay-Statement-U.S.-Court-Appeals-Ruling-MercExchange#.V 
E1tYYvF-xw. 
 61 Order Denying a Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and for Rehearing En 
Banc, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (No. 03-1600), 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10220 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2005) (excerpts from order on file with author); Order Granting Motion 
for Stay of Mandate, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (Nos. 03-1600, -1616) (Fed. Cir. 
May 11, 2005) (excerpts from order on file with author). 
 62  See Order Denying a Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and for Rehearing 
En Banc, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (No. 03-1600), 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10220 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2005) (excerpts from order on file with author); Order Granting Motion 
for Stay of Mandate, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (Nos. 03-1600, -1616) (Fed. Cir. 
May 11, 2005) (excerpts from order on file with author). 
 63 Press Release, eBay, eBay Patent Case Against MercExchange Put on Hold by 
U.S. Court of Appeals (May 13, 2005), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/ho 
me/20050513005443/en/eBay-Patent-Case-MercExchange-Put-Hold-U.S.#.VQeX1ItNnKA.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 WL 1801263. 
 66 Brief in Opposition of Writ of Certiorari, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 WL 2396812. 
 67 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005). The Supreme Court did 
not invite the Solicitor General’s office “to file an amicus brief setting forth the 
government’s views as to whether the Court should grant certiorari in” the case. “Such 
invitations, which Supreme Court practitioners refer to as ‘Calls for Views of the Solicitor 
General’ or ‘CVSG’ orders, have been an accepted part of Supreme Court practice for 
about a half century.” John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor 
General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 525 (2010). 
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whether the Supreme Court should “reconsider its precedents, 
including Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Bag Company,” a 
1908 case containing strong language requiring a near automatic 
injunction rule.68 Regarding the grant of certiorari in the case, 
MercExchange’s CEO and inventor later stated: “[W]hen cert is 
granted your case becomes a vessel in which policy gets dumped 
into; leaving you as merely a passenger-party to hold on for the 
ride.”69 
1. Parties with Interest and Briefing 
The first amici brief in the case was filed on January 17, 
2006, by the American Intellectual Property Law Association and 
the Federal Circuit Bar Association, in support of neither party.70 
In all, there were thirty-one amici briefs filed; thirteen in support 
of eBay, fourteen in support of MercExchange, and four in 
support of neither party. In total, the briefs represented 
hundreds of associations, corporations, professors, technology 
investors, and inventors.  
While a comprehensive review of all amici briefs filed is 
impractical, key parties and arguments may help provide insight 
into the impact of the case and greater policies at issue. 
Beginning with the thirteen briefs in support of eBay, some clear 
themes within the arguments are pronounced. First, in a 
representative brief filed by Time Warner, Amazon.com, 
Chevron, Cisco, Google, IAC, Infineon Tech., Shell Oil, VISA, and 
Xerox, amici argued: “[T]he automatic injunction rule grants 
patent holders leverage to extract unjust windfalls.”71 The brief 
went on to contend that the automatic injunction rule encourages 
the rise of non-practicing patent litigants and discourages the 
 
 68 eBay, 546 U.S. at 1029; see Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 
405, 430 (1908) (“From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his 
remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of 
exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the 
privilege which the law confers upon the patentee.”). 
 69 Telephone Interview with Thomas Woolston, CEO, MercExchange (July 15, 2014). 
Similarly, regarding Supreme Court briefing in the case, John Whealan, deputy general 
counsel for intellectual property law and solicitor of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office at the time of eBay, stated: “In most cases everyone has policy issues to 
discuss when Solicitor General briefing goes on in a patent case.” Telephone Interview 
with John Whealan, Dean for Intellectual Property Law Studies, The George Washington 
School of Law (Nov. 3, 2014).  
 70 Brief of Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n and Fed. Circuit Bar Ass’n as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 90 [hereinafter Brief of Am. 
Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n]. 
 71 Brief of Time Warner Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Chevron Corp., Cisco Sys., Inc., 
Google Inc., IAC/Interactive Corp., Infineon Techs. AG, Shell Oil Co., Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
and Xerox Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 
05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 167, at *13. 
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useful innovation that the patent system is intended to promote, 
through causing great costs in innovation “that could be spent 
more productively on research and development.”72 The brief also 
noted that smaller companies may waste resources on defensive 
patents further reducing funds available for additional research 
and development.73 
In a second representative brief filed in support of eBay by 
America Online, Applied Materials, Chevron, Cisco Systems, 
Google, Shell Oil, and VISA, amici curiae argued that the 
injunctions mandated by the Federal Circuit’s rule “will 
exacerbate the growing problem of abusive patent litigation.”74 
The brief went on to conclude that the abusive litigation will 
unnecessarily burden overstretched courts and undermine the 
primary goal of the patent system in promoting innovation.75 
Turning to the fourteen briefs filed in support of 
MercExchange, in a representative brief filed by GE, 3M, 
Proctor & Gamble, Du Pont, and Johnson & Johnson, amici 
argued that they have relied and invested on the presumptive 
right to an injunction and “built their respective patent portfolios 
in reliance on this bargain.”76 Further, in a brief submitted by the 
 
 72 Id. at 17–18, 22 (“Instead, [litigants that do not practice their patents] seek out 
companies that have independently developed similar innovations and then either sue 
them or extort licenses out of them based upon the threat of suit . . . . The automatic 
injunction rule gives such sophisticated professional patent litigants additional leverage 
to extract unjust settlements and license fees. The non-practicing patent plaintiff has no 
capital investments or technology of its own at stake.”). 
 73 Id. at 23 (“[T]he risk of litigation distorts business operations. For smaller firms, 
the risk of litigation is a major consideration in deciding whether to engage in research 
and development. Aware that they cannot afford the time and expense of patent litigation, 
many small companies reduce or alter their research and development efforts. . . . The 
research and development decisions of larger companies are affected as well. To avoid 
patent litigation, these companies often seek defensive patents that they would not 
otherwise prosecute, thereby reducing the funds available for additional research and 
development. . . . They also forego pursuing smaller innovations because it is safer to use 
old components and processes that are clearly in the public domain or for which they 
already own the patents.”). 
 74 Brief of Am. Online, Inc., Applied Materials, Inc., Chevron Corp., Cisco Sys., Inc., 
Google Inc., Shell Oil Co., and Visa U.S.A. Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
4–5, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2374, at *6–7 
(“Of particular concern to amici are those instances in which a court will be compelled to 
grant injunctive relief based upon infringement by a minor element of a complex good or 
service. Such injunctions can impose enormous costs wholly unrelated to the value of the 
patent infringed because they force manufacturers to retool entire complex 
processes. . . . The threat of such costs will enable unscrupulous plaintiffs, many of whom 
are well-financed and experienced patent litigants, to leverage patents of little or no value 
into massive settlements. The automatic injunction rule hands a powerful club to such 
litigants, inviting abusive patent litigation.”). 
 75 Id. at 5 (“By making otherwise frivolous litigation economically attractive and 
escalating the potential recovery in other cases, the rule adopted below will profoundly 
exacerbate this problem.”).  
 76 Brief for Gen. Elec. Co., 3M Co., Procter & Gamble Co., E.I. Du Port De Nemours 
and Co., and Johnson & Johnson as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15, eBay, 
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American Bar Association (“ABA”), the ABA argued “there would 
be significant consequences if [the Supreme Court] changes the 
current standard for granting injunctions” and “independent 
discovery without notice of the patent and a ‘close case of 
infringement’ are not viable equitable defenses.’”77 The ABA went 
on to assert that a change in the general rule would lead to 
additional litigation and promote forum-shopping in patent 
infringement cases.78 
Speaking more broadly regarding the patent system, in a 
brief submitted by the United Inventors Association, a non-profit 
group composed of “local inventor organizations as well as 
individual inventors,” amici argued that injunctive relief should 
turn on the facts of each case rather than general policy concerns 
regarding potential abuse of the patent system.79 The ABA brief 
reiterated this in stating “Congress has exclusive authority to 
establish new equitable defenses that did not exist at common 
law.”80 Finally, a number of universities submitted a brief in 
 
547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 331, at *23 (“The Amici made 
these detailed disclosures of the fruits of their research and development, rather than 
maintaining their inventions as trade secrets, based on their understanding that they 
would receive an enforceable right to exclude others from practicing those inventions for 
the term of the patent.”). 
 77 Brief of Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10−14, eBay, 
547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 342, at *16–21 (“Patent 
infringement is a strict liability offense . . . . This Court should not recognize new defenses 
in equity where none exists at law. . . . All patent licenses . . . have relied upon the general 
rule that a patentee—even one who is merely licensing, or is trying to merely license, his 
patented invention—is entitled to a permanent injunction against an adjudicated 
infringer. A change in that venerable general rule would have profound, immeasurable 
economic consequences on existing and future patent licenses. The judiciary is 
ill-equipped to decide whether the public interest would be better served by preserving or 
changing that general rule which has provided the economic foundation for patent 
licenses for a century or more.”). 
 78 Id. at 16–17 (“The real threat of a permanent injunction is a major factor that 
currently must be considered in evaluating the risks of continued litigation of any suit for 
patent infringement. The risk of a permanent injunction might cease to be a 
consideration—especially if this Court were to declare ‘close infringement’ or ‘independent 
creation’ viable defenses to an injunction. . . . Permitting district courts to consider a wide 
variety of new factors in deciding whether to impose an injunction would also create 
incentives for patentees to ‘forum-shop’ and file lawsuits in those jurisdictions where the 
bench is thought to favor permanent injunctions against infringers. This would have the 
effect of undoing one of the goals for which the Federal Circuit was created, the 
elimination of forum-shopping in patent cases.”). 
 79 Brief of United Inventors Ass’n and Tech. Licensing Corp. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of MercExchange, L.L.C., on the Merits, eBay, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 
2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 333, at *4 (“The Amici believe that the ability to obtain 
injunctions, whether or not the patent owner is practicing the invention, is important to 
the licensing efforts of independent inventors. Such licensing is essential to continued 
research and development efforts by inventors across the country and the world.”). 
 80 Brief of Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 77, at 9–10 (“[T]he equitable considerations 
advanced by Petitioners are properly addressed to Congress, not to the federal courts. 
Congress is best able to evaluate these policy considerations . . . .” (quoting Nw. Airlines, 
Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 88 n.41 (1981))). 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 11:45 AM 
694 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
favor of MercExchange, and emphasized their role in innovation 
by stating the “academic sector drives research and innovation in 
the United States . . . . [T]he sector accounted for an estimated 
54% of the basic research conducted in this country.”81 After 
noting their strong interest in the outcome of the case, as 
academic amici are similarly situated “non-manufacturing 
entities” who license their inventions to the private sector, the 
university brief argued that all patentees should continue to have 
the same right to permanent injunctive relief.82 
The final amicus brief in support of MercExchange was filed 
by the United States and signed by the Patent and Trademark 
Office, Department of Justice, and Solicitor General.83 The brief 
asserted that: patent injunctions should be issued in accordance 
with the four equitable principles; injunctive relief should turn 
on the facts of each individual case; and “although the Court of 
Appeals did not recite the governing equitable principles, it 
correctly concluded that the district court abused its discretion.”84 
The United States brief concluded that the Supreme Court need 
not overrule Continental Paper Bag, because that precedent was 
only dicta in the case which “could be read to support an 
erroneous rule of automatic or nearly automatic injunction 
relief . . . .”85 
 
 81 Brief of Wis. Alumni Research Found., Am. Council on Education, Ass’n of Univ. 
Tech. Managers, Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., Cal. Inst. of Tech., NDSU Research 
Found., Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Research Corp. Techs., Tex. A&M Univ. System’s 
Office of Techn. Commercialization, Univ. of Va. Patent Found. and Wash. Research 
Found. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1, 9, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 
2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 341, at *1, 5–6 (“Making it more difficult for 
non-manufacturing entities like universities to obtain permanent injunctions also would 
reduce the leverage the academic sector needs to negotiate reasonable licensing 
agreements with potential licensees. Limiting injunctive relief similarly would mean that 
the academic section could no longer count on the right to exclusive use of an invention 
that the availability of an injunction protects. Universities need such certainty to form 
and invest in start-up companies built on university inventions.”). 
 82 Id. at 2, 11. 
 83 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, 547 U.S. 
388 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 327 [hereinafter Brief for United States]. 
 84 Id. at 23 (“The court of appeals did not recite or explicitly apply the traditional 
four-part test that governs the district court's exercise of equitable discretion, but it 
properly concluded that the district court abused its discretion by relying on 
inappropriate considerations in withholding equitable relief. Because this Court ‘reviews 
judgments, not statements in opinions,’ the court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed, 
and the case should be returned to the district court for entry of an appropriately tailored 
injunction.”). See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 2 (stating that many amici parties, 
including the Solicitor General, referred to some version of the four traditional injunction 
factors but “did not all cite the same four factors”).  
 85 Brief for United States, supra note 83, at 29–30 (emphasis added) (“The Court's 
decision in Continental Paper Bag arguably contains questionable dicta that could be read 
to support an erroneous rule of automatic or nearly automatic injunctive relief, but its 
central holding is sound. That holding, which the Court has repeatedly endorsed, is 
consistent with 35 U.S.C. 283, as well as with the collective experience of the federal 
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Turning to the four amici curiae briefs in support of neither 
party, two are worthy of discussion. First, the brief of IBM 
essentially argued in favor of eBay. IBM began its brief by noting 
that the original Patent Act of 1790 only gave patentees a 
remedy of monetary damages; the statutory remedy for patent 
injunctions was not introduced until 1819. Continuing its focus 
on history, IBM went on to argue that in “the 98 years since 
Continental Paper Bag, the patent laws and their interpretation 
have adapted to changes in technology and business operations, 
but the Federal Circuit’s approach in addressing patent 
injunctions has become rigid.”86 IBM summarized that if an 
injunction would cause an infringer to abandon a significant 
investment, incur significant additional costs unrelated to 
technological merits, or block an infringing product that contains 
many thousands of technological elements, that disproportionate 
impact should weigh against an injunction.87 
Finally, the Intellectual Property Law Association and 
Federal Circuit Bar Association Brief in Support of Neither Party 
argued an explanatory position of the Federal Circuit opinion. 
While the brief recognized that the traditional equitable factors 
apply, it argued that a patentee is normally entitled to an 
injunction under those factors.88 In support of the Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning, the brief went on to assert three fundamental 
points: “the Federal Circuit’s ‘general rule’ correctly recognizes 
that patentees lack an adequate remedy at law”; “the Federal 
Circuit’s ‘general rule’ has been part of the patent system for 
more than a century and a half”; and “the Federal Circuit’s 
‘general rule’ is consistent with the analysis applied in other 
areas of property law.”89 
 
courts in applying the principles of equity to patent disputes.”). 
 86 Brief of Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, 
eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 164, at *11–12. 
 87 Id. at 3 (“If an injunction would cause the infringer to abandon a significant 
investment or incur significant additional costs unrelated to technological merits of the 
invention, that may weigh against a broad injunction. Similarly, where an infringing 
product contains many thousands of technological elements, an injunction against a 
minor, infringing element could have a disproportionate impact on the infringer by 
preventing the marketing of the entire product, an entire product line and/or interrelated 
products.”). 
 88 Brief of Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 70, at 3 (“The Federal 
Circuit's ‘general rule’ that a permanent injunction will normally issue in a patent case 
once liability has been established is fully consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 283 and is 
well-grounded in the traditional factors governing the issuance of injunctions. The 
Federal Circuit’s statement of the ‘general rule’ appropriately recognizes that three of the 
traditional injunction factors (irreparable harm, inadequate remedy at law and the public 
interest), will normally favor the patentee as a result of the inherently limited nature of 
the patent's exclusive right and the strong public policy favoring enforcement of valid 
patents.”). 
 89 Id. at 10, 19–20. 
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Summarizing the amici curiae brief issues the day before 
oral argument, the Wall Street Journal stated the following: 
[T]o say that this case is about Ebay’s “Buy It Now” feature is like 
saying Moby Dick is about a whale. Roughly thirty parties have 
submitted briefs to the Supreme Court weighing in on the injunction 
issue. Supporting MercExchange and arguing for courts’ strong 
injunctive powers are companies fiercely protective of their patents 
such as General Electric and Procter & Gamble. Arguing on Ebay’s 
side are tech companies such as Intel and Microsoft that hope to give 
considerable discretion to the courts in deciding whether to issue 
injunctions.90 
2. Supreme Court Oral Argument 
The Supreme Court oral argument was held on March 29, 
2006. Carter G. Phillips argued for eBay, Seth P. Waxman 
argued for MercExchange, and Jeffrey P. Minear argued for the 
United States. To begin the argument, the question framed by 
eBay was “whether or not the . . . [Federal Circuit] rule that 
declares categorically that three out of the four traditional factors 
for deciding . . . injunctive relief will be irrebuttably presumed to 
be satisfied whenever a jury has found that a patent is valid and 
has been infringed.”91 Further, regarding the facts of the case, 
eBay’s counsel repeatedly emphasized that “we not only intend to 
but have, in fact, implemented a design-around or a work-around 
to this particular patent.”92 In opposition to the general 
argument, MercExchange’s counsel rebutted that “a final 
judgment of patent infringement yields an injunction in all but 
the very rare case, and that settled regime is not an exception to 
traditional equitable principles. It’s an application of those 
principles.”93 Regarding MercExchange’s factual emphasis before 
the Court, MercExchange’s counsel reiterated that 
MercExchange  
is no patent troll. The founder of MercExchange really did invent this 
innovation. He really did . . . spend years of effort trying to build the 
system to suit himself . . . . He was [then] asked by eBay in 2000 to 
consider selling [the patents] . . . offered to license them . . . and eBay 
then stole the technology.94  
 
 90 Peter Lattman, Ebay v. MercExchange: Sizing up the Case and Its Lawyers, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2006, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/03/28/ebay-v-merc 
exchange-sizing-up-the-lawyers/. 
 91 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-130.pdf. 
 92 Id. at 17.  
 93 Id. at 37. 
 94 Id. at 42–43. For a full discussion of the MercExchange invention history, see 
generally Holte, supra note 4. 
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To summarize the argument, and concerns of the Court, a 
few representative questions are worth noting. First, during the 
argument, there was much discussion regarding business method 
patents. When Chief Justice Roberts pressed the issue of whether 
Judge Friedman’s “concern over the issuance of business method 
patents . . . [was] appropriate consideration to take into account 
in determining whether to grant an injunction,” eBay’s counsel 
conceded, “I think probably, at the end of the day, it wouldn’t 
be . . . .”95 Justice Kennedy came back to this, stating that 
business method patents “can be very restrictive” and that if “you 
take that [consideration] away, I don’t know if you’ve got a lot left 
for . . . saying no injunction in this case.”96 
Further, regarding specific representative questions by the 
Court, Justice Ginsberg emphasized to eBay’s counsel that “[o]ne 
of the problems with the district court exercising equitable 
discretion without a close review by the Federal Circuit is just 
the thing that the Federal Circuit was created to handle . . . . the 
Federal Circuit is put there . . . so that you won’t have wide 
disparities . . . .”97 Regarding inventor control of inventions, Chief 
Justice Roberts asked “if I invent something . . . [a] better way to 
make a car engine work and I want to sell that to 
somebody . . . you’d say that’s not practicing the invention 
because I don’t build cars?”98 Justice Scalia added, “[W]hy should 
I be in better shape, as far as getting an injunction is concerned, 
if I produce an automobile engine?” To the engine design 
questions, eBay’s counsel replied, “[MercExchange] is not a 
competitor in the market. If they were . . . you have a much 
better claim to a need to occupy space . . . . [I]f you chose not to 
occupy it, it’s not to say that you abandon your right to an 
injunction, but that ought to be a legitimate, individualized 
consideration . . . .”99 
There were fewer questions to MercExchange’s counsel 
during oral argument—and less time, since part of 
MercExchange’s argument was allotted to the government—but 
perhaps more factual questions regarding the patent. Concerning 
reexamination of the patent-in-suit, Chief Justice Roberts asked, 
“Could the district court say, well, the patent office staff has 
rejected every claim of this patent, and I’m going to take that into 
account in deciding whether to put eBay out of business?”100 
 
 95 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 91, at 14. 
 96 Id. at 16. 
 97 Id. at 11–12. 
 98 Id. at 23. 
 99 Id. at 25. 
 100 Id. at 39. At the time of oral argument, the MercExchange ’265 patent had been 
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MercExchange’s counsel responded emphasizing that the patent 
had been involved in patent office administrative proceedings for 
“almost 3 years . . . [without] a final action.”101 Indeed, earlier in 
the argument, the Assistant Solicitor General had explained the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) office action 
process, board of patent appeals processes (BPAI), and then 
judicial review, noting how long that took and the likely reversals 
after an initial early-stage office action.102 Perhaps more 
damaging to MercExchange, however, later in the argument, 
Chief Justice Roberts asked, “[W]hat exactly is the invention 
here?”103 After some stumbling in response, MercExchange’s 
counsel replied, “[I]t’s not a business method. It doesn’t claim 
methods. It claims a system, an apparatus for an electronic 
market for the sale of goods via a network.”104 Without greater 
detail, the Chief Justice continued, “[I]t’s displaying pictures of 
your wares on a computer network and, you know, picking which 
ones you want and buying them. I—I might have been able to do 
that.”105 MercExchange’s counsel was unable to provide greater 
detail, but simply emphasized in response that the patent had 
gone through a lengthy Markman hearing and been upheld at 
the district court and Federal Circuit concerning written 
description.106 
Lastly, during the government’s argument, the Assistant 
Solicitor General emphasized that the Court can “provide 
guidance on how [the four equitable factors] are applied in the 
patent context . . . .”107 Chief Justice Roberts characterized the 
argument as, “[A]ll you want us to do is edit [the Federal Circuit] 
opinion and stick in this formulaic paragraph about [‘]there are 
four factors[’] and here they are.”108 The Assistant Solicitor 
General responded that the government’s position was that the 
Court make clear the test was an exercise of “equitable 
 
rejected under obviousness during the reexamination process at the Patent and 
Trademark Office. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562–63 (E.D. 
Va. 2007) (“Although the PTO has not yet issued a final office action in either pertinent 
reexamination, a ruling that would be appealable . . . the PTO has issued interim office 
actions in both reexaminations, twice indicating that all claims of the #256 patent are 
invalid as obvious . . . .”). However, the reexamination rejections at the Patent Office were 
eventually overcome, and the patent allowed. See Holte, supra note 4, at 29 (where the 
ultimate settlement between eBay and MercExchange included full assignment of the 
remaining patents and patent applications related to online auctions).  
 101 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 91, at 40. 
 102 Id. at 29. 
 103 Id. at 47. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 48–49. 
 106 Id. at 49. 
 107 Id. at 28. 
 108 Id. at 27–28. 
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discretion”, but provide further guidance regarding questions of 
patent injunctions.109 
Regarding specific questions from Justice Stevens concerning 
damages and adequate remedies, the Assistant Solicitor General 
asserted, “[D]amages are not an adequate remedy . . . the 
injunction harnesses the market to determine what the market 
value of that patent is. It forces negotiation between the 
parties . . . .”110 This reiterated a point Justice Scalia made at the 
beginning of the argument to eBay’s counsel: “[W]hy isn’t 
the . . . free market normally adequate to solve any problems 
you’re talking about? Everybody is in this for the money. Nobody 
is going to hold off giving the license beyond the point where—
where it makes financial sense.”111 The government’s argument 
ended with emphasis that “there should not be an automatic 
distinction between a party that practices the patent and one 
that licenses it.”112 Generally speaking, the government 
continued to emphasize the need for injunctions in patent cases, 
but only after a consideration under the four-part equitable test. 
3. Supreme Court Opinion and Two Concurrences 
The Supreme Court issued its decision in the case on May 
15, 2006.113 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a 
unanimous Court; Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring 
opinion (joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg), as did Justice 
Kennedy (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer).114 
The unanimous opinion held that a federal court considering 
whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing 
plaintiff in a dispute arising under the Patent Act must apply the 
four-factor test “historically employed by courts of equity.”115 The 
 
 109 Id. at 28. 
 110 Id. at 31–32. 
 111 Id. at 11. 
 112 Id. at 36. 
 113 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 114 Id.; see id. at 394 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 115 Id. at 390 (majority opinion). Some have argued that this “historical” or 
“traditional” notion for a permanent injunction test was not actually historical or 
traditional. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay 
v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007) (“Remedies specialists had never 
heard of the four-point test.”); LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 426 (arguing that there was “no 
‘traditional’ four-part test” and that the Supreme Court majority’s citations supporting 
the four-part test are misplaced in cases related to preliminary injunctions). But see 
Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597, 597 (2010) (“eBay is not a 
remarkable break from equitable practice. Indeed, the principles outlined by the Court in 
its decision are neither novel or surprising when viewed in light of previous precedents.”); 
Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1029 
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Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit failed to recite and 
apply the correct test: 
The [Federal Circuit] articulated a “general rule,” unique to patent 
disputes, “that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement 
and validity have been adjudged.” . . . Because we conclude that 
neither [the Federal Circuit nor the district court] correctly applied 
the traditional four-factor framework that governs the award of 
injunctive relief, we vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals . . . .116 
The Court accordingly vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, which applied the general rule that courts will issue 
permanent injunctions, and held in favor of petitioner-eBay.117 
Finally, the unanimous opinion contained the following limiting 
disclaimer: “We hold only that the decision whether to grant or 
deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the 
district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised 
consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent 
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such 
standards.”118 Between 2000 and 2010, the eBay case stands as 
the only patent case where the party supported by the Solicitor 
General did not win.119  
Worthy of note in the unanimous opinion are two guidance 
points regarding how courts should address equitable principles, 
specifically regarding non-commercializing patentees like 
MercExchange. First, regarding the district court’s discussion of 
MercExchange’s “lack of commercial activity in practicing the 
patents,”120 the Court stated: 
[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad 
classifications. For example, some patent holders, such as university 
researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license 
their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing 
necessary to bring their works to market themselves. Such patent 
holders may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we 
see no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.121 
 
(2015) (“The test in eBay is not ‘the traditional four-factor test,’ but it is ‘a traditional 
four-factor test.’ Even so, the most fundamental objection to eBay from scholars of 
remedies is not to the Court’s overclaiming. It is to the Court’s entrenchment of doctrinal 
formulations that distinguish legal and equitable remedies: the irreparable injury rule 
and ‘no adequate remedy at law’ requirement.”) (citations omitted). 
 116 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94 (citations omitted). 
 117 Id. at 390. 
 118 Id. at 394. 
 119 Duffy, supra note 67, at 538. Prof. Duffy notes, “[E]ven in [the eBay] case, the 
Court adopted the legal analysis applied by the Solicitor General . . . .” Id. 
 120 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. 
 121 Id. 
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On this point, the Court concluded that the district court’s 
“analysis cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted 
by Congress.”122 Second, the Court explicitly affirmed Continental 
Paper Bag, the 1908 case which held that courts can grant 
injunctive relief in favor of patent holders who “unreasonably 
decline[] to use [their] patent.”123 In short, while technically 
reversing the Federal Circuit’s opinion in favor of MercExchange, 
and not taking any “position on whether permanent injunctive 
relief should or should not issue in this particular case,”124 the 
unanimous opinion spoke very kindly of the four-factor equitable 
test favoring injunctions for non-practicing patent owners.125 
Indeed, the affirmed 1908 Continental opinion stated: “Standing 
alone, non-use is no efficient reason for withholding injunction. 
There are many reasons for non-use which, upon explanation, are 
cogent . . . . Anything but prevention takes away the privilege 
which the law confers upon the patentee.”126  
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion was only two 
paragraphs in length and focused on the historical precedent of 
injunctions in patent cases. After beginning his opinion by noting 
that the Court’s majority holding rested upon the traditional 
notions of equity, he went into a discussion of that tradition 
vis-à-vis patent cases: Since the early nineteenth century, “courts 
have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in 
the vast majority of patent cases.”127 In his opinion, this 
traditional practice was not surprising “given the difficulty of 
protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 394. 
 125 See Janutis, supra note 115, at 617 (“Moreover, Justice Thomas emphasized the 
district court’s overreliance on MercExchange’s willingness to license its patent and its 
lack of commercial activity to explain the error in the district court’s reasoning. Justice 
Thomas expressly acknowledged that ‘traditional equitable principles’ would not support 
a categorical presumption that a non-practicing patent holder was not entitled to an 
injunction. Further, Justice Thomas pointed to the non-commercial research institution 
and ‘self-made inventors’ as examples of patent holders whose failure to practice and 
willingness to license might still warrant an injunction. Justice Thomas noted that such 
patent holders might be entitled to an injunction because they ‘might reasonably prefer to 
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to 
bring their works to market themselves.’”); see also Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory 
Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 
32 (2009) (“[W]hile holding that courts must review the four-factor test, Justice Thomas’ 
opinion for the unanimous Court was officially agnostic on the question of whether 
nonpracticing patentees were entitled to injunctive relief.”). 
 126 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 427, 430 (1908). Despite 
the Court explicitly affirming Continental, some commentators have argued that the 
opinion’s generalities about equities stand in significant tension with the argument and 
holding from Continental. Eric Claeys, The Conceptual Relation Between IP Rights and 
Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 127 eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s 
wishes . . . .”128 Chief Justice Roberts concluded by citing Justice 
Holmes: Regarding the application of equitable standards in 
patent cases in favor of granting injunctive relief, “a page of 
history is worth a volume of logic.”129  
Justice Kennedy’s three-paragraph concurring opinion—of 
mere “observations,”130 as he referenced it—first supported the 
majority opinion’s “well-established, four-factor test . . . in 
deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in patent cases.”131 
Second, Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’ 
“lesson of the historical practice”; however, he distinguished this 
instruction to “when the circumstances of a case bear substantial 
parallels to litigation courts have confronted before.”132 Justice 
Kennedy went on to cite to a single Internet-posted 2003 FTC 
report summarizing a panel discussion concerning “The Rise of 
Non-practicing Entities” in the computer hardware industry.133 
With this citation, he stated:  
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis 
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining 
licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially 
serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to 
buy licenses to practice the patent.134 
Applying the FTC report details to the patent injunction 
issue at hand, Justice Kennedy concluded that “legal damages 
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement,” “an 
injunction may not serve the public interest,” and the “potential 
vagueness and suspect validity of [business method patents] may 
affect the calculus under the four-factor test.”135 Regarding these 
 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id.; see also Jay Dratler, Jr., eBay’s Practical Effect: Two Differing Visions, 
2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 35, 43 (2008) (“The thrust of the[] concurrence was that the 
results of permanent-injunction hearings in patent cases need not change drastically as a 
result of the Court’s unanimous insistence on a four-factor equitable analysis.”). 
 130 eBay, 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 131 Id. at 395. 
 132 Id. 396. 
 133 Id. (citing FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38–39 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-
and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 396–97. But see Mulder, supra note 44, at 69 (concluding that the Roberts 
and Kennedy concurrences were intended by their authors to articulate rules regarding 
when emerging issues should be considered—or not considered—when determining 
whether granting an injunction is appropriate). Regarding Justice Kennedy’s concerns, it 
is important to note that patent law already contains many safeguards regarding the 
control of patent owners. See, e.g., Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted 
Defendant: Should Parties Be Able to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent 
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conclusions, however, given that the Kennedy concurrence was 
self-described as “observations,” the FTC report citation was 
simply a summary of testimony related to an off-subject 
discussion (computer hardware). The briefing and oral argument 
before the Court deeply considered injunctions for specific classes 
of patents, and the unanimous opinion of the Court explicitly 
affirmed Continental—the concurrence can truly only be 
considered a general “observation” by a minority of the Court, 
with no precedential value or citation intended.136 
4. Media Attention During and After Supreme Court Appeal 
Beyond the usual coverage of Supreme Court cases during a 
Term, to properly analyze the eBay opinion and its impact, it is 
necessary to note the most active media details regarding patent 
issues during the eBay timeframe. First, while the case was 
pending at the Supreme Court, there was widespread publicity 
and media discussion regarding another patent injunction case, 
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., that was reported to have 
the potential to result in the shutdown of all BlackBerry wireless 
Internet service.137 This case had a certiorari petition denied by 
the Supreme Court during the same Term as eBay and was a 
very hot story in the day-to-day press, receiving more press 
coverage than any other patent case within the 2005–2007 time 
period.138 Indeed, “[m]any of the briefs in eBay urged the Court to 
do something about this [BlackBerry phone shutdown] 
problem,”139 and one empirical study regarding the press 
coverage of the NTP and eBay cases together concluded: 
[The study] clearly illustrates not only the relative prevalence of the 
coverage of NTP vs. that pertaining to eBay over the course of the 
study period, but also the high concentration of NTP coverage during 
(1) the weeks (weeks 41 through 48) leading up to the grant of 
certiorari in eBay (week 49), and (2) the period between the grant of 
certiorari in eBay (B) in November, 2005 (Week 49) and the oral 
argument in eBay (E) on March 29, 2006 (Week 66).140  
 
Litigation?, 2 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 445, 479 (2014) (“[P]atent exhaustion may also 
play a role in preserving room for innovation because it limits the right of exclusion from 
being passed down the chain of production and distribution.”).  
 136 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was also likely influenced by increased negative 
patent injunction press coverage. For a further discussion of this issue, see Dolak 
& Bettinger, infra note 140. 
 137 LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 427–28. 
 138 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1157 (2006) (No. 05-638). 
 139 LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 428. 
 140 Lisa A. Dolak & Blaine T. Bettinger, eBay and the BlackBerry®: A Media 
Coverage Case Study, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 24 (2008). 
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That same study also noted that “eBay received more 
coverage than any of the other Supreme Court cases pending or 
decided during the [two year] study period.”141  
Second, after the Supreme Court opinion was issued, eBay 
released a statement saying the following: 
eBay Applauds Supreme Court Ruling 
San Jose, Calif., May 15, 2006—eBay . . . applauds today’s Supreme 
Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange, which reversed the ruling by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Court 
requiring that an injunction must be issued in this case. eBay argued 
that trial judges ought to have the discretion—expressly granted by 
Congress—to award money damages to patent owners, instead of 
injunctions, if the facts of a particular case warrant it. The Supreme 
Court agreed with eBay that the injunction rule applied by the 
Federal Circuit was unduly narrow. “We are extremely gratified by 
the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision,” said Jay Monahan, eBay’s 
Deputy General Counsel, Intellectual Property. “The trial judge 
originally found in this case that money was sufficient, and denied an 
injunction. We are confident that when the District Court revisits this 
issue, particularly in light of the ongoing reexamination of the 
patents, that the result will be the same.”142  
Following up on this “win” for eBay within its own press 
release, many other media sources reported in similar fashion 
 
 141 Id. at 12. The study period included the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 Supreme Court 
Terms. The patent cases in those terms are: KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 
(2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. 
v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006); Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); and Unitherm 
Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006). Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 
140, at 2, n.10. 
 142 eBay Applauds Supreme Court Ruling, EBAY INC. (May 15, 2006), 
http://investor.ebay.com/common/mobile/iphone/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=197425&Com
panyID=ebay. It is interesting to compare this press release language to eBay’s July 2006 
SEC quarterly filing, which stated: 
In May 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision 
on whether an injunction should have been issued and remanded the case back 
to the district court for further action. . . . Even if successful, our litigation of 
these matters will continue to be costly. In addition, as a precautionary 
measure, we have modified certain functionality of our websites and business 
practices in a manner which we believe would avoid any further infringement. 
For this reason, we believe that any injunction that might be issued by the 
district court will not have any impact on our business . . . Nonetheless, if the 
district court were to issue an injunction on remand, and if the modifications to 
the functionality of our websites and business practices are not sufficient to 
make them non-infringing, we would likely be forced to pay significant 
additional damages and licensing fees and/or modify our business practices in 
an adverse manner. 
eBay Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 37–38 (July 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000095013406014091/f223 71e10vq.htm. 
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during and after the opinion. For example, Forbes reported the 
following: 
Supreme Court Buries Patent Trolls 
In a victory for eBay, the justices ruled unanimously that federal 
courts must weigh several factors before barring a patent infringer 
from using a contested technology or business method. . . . Now the 
case will be sent back to the U.S. District Court where eBay originally 
won the right to continue operating “Buy It Now” while it designs 
around the patent it infringed. . . . The high court’s decision deals a 
blow to patent trolls, which are notorious for using the threat of 
permanent injunction to extort hefty fees in licensing negotiations as 
well as huge settlements from companies they have accused of 
infringing. . . . Recall the $612.5 million that Canada’s Research in 
Motion forked over to patent-holding company NTP to avoid the 
shutting down of its popular BlackBerry service. . . . In accepting the 
case and ruling as they did, the justices seemed to have had it in mind 
to hem in their power.143 
Indeed, much of the press coverage during the time the case 
was pending at the Supreme Court, and after the opinion was 
issued, carried on the anti-patent troll message.144 Legal 
empiricists have even put forth data regarding anti-patent troll 
press coverage during the time eBay was pending to suggest that 
the increased negative patent injunction message related to the 
NTP case was relevant to the Court’s resolution—or at least 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically—in the eBay case.145  
II. EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE AFTER THE SUPREME COURT 
After the May 2006 Supreme Court opinion, the case was 
remanded to Judge Friedman in the Eastern District of Virginia. 
However, there were almost two years of contentious litigation 
between the parties, at both the district court and the Federal 
Circuit, before the case would finally settle. 
 
 143 Jessica Holzer, Supreme Court Buries Patent Trolls, FORBES (May 16, 2006, 6:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/15/ebay-scotus-patent-ruling-cx_jh_0516scotus.html. 
 144 Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 140, at 27 (“Additionally, beyond descriptive 
references to the NTP plaintiff as a ‘patent-holding company,’ and mentions that a 
BlackBerry®-service ending injunction could issue/might have issued, the media coverage 
leading up to and during the pendency of eBay at the Supreme Court also delivered the 
(negative) message that such companies should not be entitled to enforce their patents, or 
to enforce them on the same terms as other patentees . . . .”). 
 145 Id. at 31 (“That coverage, which was heavily concentrated in the seven weeks 
leading up to the grant of certiorari in eBay, and in the several months between the 
certiorari grant and the oral argument, contained significant discussion of particular 
considerations that were potentially relevant to the resolution of the question at issue in 
eBay, and ultimately expressly regarded as relevant by four of the Justices.”). The study 
included anti-patent message coding, including “negative message 13,” and stated, 
“[P]atents are (and shouldn’t be) awarded to/enforceable by those who don’t develop 
products/practice the invention.” Id. at 18, n.83. 
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A.  eBay v. MercExchange in Further Proceedings Before the 
District Court 
1. Additional District Court Proceedings Before 
Reconsideration of the Injunction 
The case was officially remanded to the district court, 
through the Federal Circuit, on July 13, 2006.146 Within a few 
weeks, on August 28, 2006, eBay filed for a motion to stay 
proceedings pending PTO reexamination of the patents-in-suit, 
and MercExchange again filed for a permanent injunction.147  
In its renewed motion for permanent injunction, 
MercExchange noted that after the Federal Circuit appeal, 
judgment of validity and infringement of the ’265 patent was 
final.148 Regarding the legal standard for the injunction, in 
addition to the Supreme Court majority opinion, MercExchange 
cited the same Eastern District of Virginia case cited by eBay in 
its 2003 injunction opposition brief, also cited by Judge Friedman 
in his 2003 denial of an injunction—essentially the same factors 
as before.149 MercExchange again went through the four-factor 
analysis discussed in its 2003 briefing, emphasizing that 
“because eBay is a virtual monopolist, commanding 90 percent of 
the online auction market, no potential competitor can gain a 
foothold to compete against eBay so long as eBay is not enjoined 
from infringing MercExchange’s technology.”150 Finally, 
 
 146 Order Vacating the Judgment of the Dist. Court and Remanding for Further 
Proceedings Consistent with the Op. of the U.S. S. Ct., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 2:01-cv-736) (on file with author). 
 147 Motion to Stay Proceedings in View of Ongoing Patent Office Reexamination 
Proceedings by eBay, Inc., Half.com, Inc., MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 
(No. 2:01-cv-736).; Motion for Permanent Injunction by MercExchange, L.L.C., 
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 2:01-cv-736) (on file with author). 
 148 Plaintiff MercExchange, L.L.C.’s Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Entry of 
a Permanent Injunction Order at 6, MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 2:01-cv-736), 
2006 WL 5359293 [hereinafter Renewed Motion for Injunction Brief] (on file with author). 
 149 Id. at 9 (citing Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794–97 
(E.D. Va. 1998)); see also Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff MercExchange, L.L.C.’s Brief 
in Support of Motion for Entry of a Permanent Injunction Order, supra note 20. Compare 
Odetics, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (“Issuance of injunctive relief . . . is governed by traditional 
equitable principles, which require consideration of (i) whether the plaintiff would face 
irreparable injury if the injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff has an 
adequate remedy at law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in the public interest, and 
(iv) whether the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor.”), with eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that 
it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 150 Renewed Motion for Injunction Brief, supra note 148, at 16. But the harm to 
MercExchange is particularly severe on the record here. MercExchange, and 
MercExchange’s licensees or potential licensees, are (or aspire to be) competitors of eBay—
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regarding the Supreme Court concurrences, MercExchange cited 
both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in emphasizing 
that the “historical practice . . . [is] still important in the court’s 
weighing of the four equitable factors.”151 
Former United States Solicitor General Seth Waxman joined 
the MercExchange legal team at the district court in September 
2006152—presumably in expectation of oral argument on the 
injunction issue—however, in December 2006, Judge Friedman 
ordered additional discovery before considering the renewed 
injunction motion or the stay pending reexamination.153 During 
the additional discovery, tensions between the parties increased 
and in March 2007, Judge Friedman issued a six-page order 
summarizing, inter alia: 
Presently before the court are too many letters and motions for the 
court to list, all are tangential to the two primary motions that the 
court has endeavored to address for over six months: MercExchange’s 
Motion for an Injunction and eBay’s Motion to Stay . . . the parties 
have on several occasions revealed their belief that the instant matter 
is the only case pending in this district as the parties demanded 
almost constant attention from the Magistrate Judge . . . At some 
point during what this court thought was supposed to be a brief 
period of limited discovery, that parties’ inability to conduct five 
one-day depositions became almost comical . . . Most of the motions 
and letters are either a request to strike prior filings or an attempt to 
advance additional argument in support of prior filings; such 
duplicative arguments result in an exponential growth to the 
mountain of paperwork which frankly mystifies the court . . . the court 
does not and is frustrated by not only the sheer volume of unnecessary 
paperwork and speed in which counsel expect the court to respond, 
but also counsel’s inability to work together to complete what the 
court views as a relatively simple task: take five depositions and serve 
associated document requests to bring the record up to date on recent 
factual developments.154 
The conclusion of Judge Friedman’s order, and the tensions 
between counsel, was that the court would also consider 
cross-motions regarding “unclean hands” at the same time it 
 
an entity that commands 90 percent of the relevant market. Id. 
 151 Id. at 10, n.5 (“Justice Kennedy noted that the right to exclude does not inexorably 
dictate injunctive relief; rather, the four-factor test, applied in the context of analogous 
historical practice, governs.”). 
 152 Motion for Seth Paul Waxman to Appear Pro Hac Vice by MercExchange, L.L.C., 
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 2:01-cv-736) (on file with author).  
 153 Order and Op. Permitting Both Parties until March 2, 2007 to Perform Additional 
Discovery, MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 2:01-cv-736) (on file with author). 
 154 Order and Op. at 1–3, 5, n. 4, MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 2:01-cv-
736) (emphasis in original) (on file with author).  
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considered the motions for injunction and to stay pending 
reexamination.155 
2. District Court Injunction Oral Argument 
Following the additional discovery and updated briefing, the 
district court held oral arguments on the injunction issue June 
12, 2007.156 After arguing the injunction issue for MercExchange 
before the Supreme Court, Seth Waxman argued the same issue, 
on remand, before the district court.157 There are four key points, 
important to Judge Friedman regarding MercExchange, worth 
noting. 
First, regarding the Supreme Court opinion, Mr. Waxman 
made the point: “[N]either the chief justice’s concurring opinion 
nor Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion garnered five 
votes . . . So what a majority of the Supreme Court genuinely 
thinks, other than that the four-factor test should be applied, is 
yet to be determined.”158 To this assertion, Judge Friedman 
questioned Mr. Waxman regarding the “patent troll”159 issue at 
length and whether MercExchange was a “troll.”160 
Second, Judge Friedman had many questions regarding 
MercExchange’s alleged exclusive license arrangement with 
Internet auction company uBid,161 eBay’s largest competitor.162 
Specifically, Judge Friedman emphasized the recent suspect 
timing of the uBid contract, subsequent to the jury trial.163 To 
this point, Mr. Waxman emphasized that eBay “utterly 
mischaracterized the deposition testimony of the uBid witness”164 
and further noted: “[L]ook at the three licenses that are in the 
record, not only the uBid license but the Aden license and the 
AutoTrader license, each one has unique and uniquely bargained 
for terms, and it’s that factor plus the factor that we have a 
 
 155 Id. at 5. 
 156 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 556 
(No. 2:01-cv-736) (on file with author). 
 157 Id. at 3. 
 158 Id. at 7. 
 159 Id. at 8 (question from Judge Friedman). 
 160 Id. at 10 (question from Judge Friedman questioning MercExchange only having 
two employees). 
 161 Id. at 10–11. 
 162 Id. at 90 (“uBid is eBay’s largest competitor . . . albeit it has only about 2 perhaps 
3 percent of the market share . . . .”); MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 575–76 (stating 
that uBid obtained a non-exclusive license to MercExchange’s patent portfolio and 
negotiated an exclusive license in exchange for a twenty-five percent interest in 
MercExchange). 
 163 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at 11. 
 164 Id. at 19. 
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monopolist here [eBay] that makes this case genuinely cry out for 
an injunction.”165  
Third, Judge Friedman had many questions regarding a 
hedge fund which had invested in MercExchange.166 He 
referenced the fund as “speculators . . . gamblers,” to which Mr. 
Waxman responded: “They have basically made a determination 
that this is a valid investment on the probability . . . that an 
enforceable injunction will issue in favor of this patent holder.”167  
Lastly, Judge Friedman addressed the issue of eBay 
allegedly designing around the patent. This detail, originally 
raised by MercExchange in prior briefing, was based on eBay’s 
SEC quarterly reports stating to investors: “[W]e have modified 
certain functionality of our websites and business practices in a 
manner which we believe would avoid any further infringement. 
For this reason, we believe that any injunction that might be 
issued by the district court will not have any impact on our 
business.”168 On this issue, Judge Friedman stated: “I thought it 
was ludicrous when counsel, after or during the trial, said we 
could design around this patent in a couple of hours . . . for, like, 
$8,000, and the first thought I had was why in the world didn’t 
they do it to avoid this whole mess.”169 Mr. Waxman agreed with 
the hypocrisy and Judge Friedman stated further: “What 
concerns me, Mr. Waxman, is no matter what this Court does 
today . . . what happens at that point? It’s going to go on and on 
and on, and I never could understand why we were ever placed in 
this position, but there is nothing that I can do about that.”170 
Regarding eBay’s argument before the court, there were two 
key points impressed to Judge Friedman by counsel. First, eBay’s 
counsel asserted the notion that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in the Supreme Court’s opinion allows district court judges to 
prevent patent holders from asserting “undue leverage” with the 
 
 165 Id. at 15. 
 166 Id. at 19. 
 167 Id. at 20; see also id. at 41 (“[T]he [MercExchange investment money] was given to 
them by a speculator, hoping that maybe [the money] will turn out to be a sound 
investment.”). 
 168 eBay Inc., Quarterly Report, supra note 142, at 15. As noted at oral argument, 
eBay’s non-infringing design around consisted of: “The main issues are, Your Honor, that 
we changed our log-in process. When you sell an item, we changed it. We simply removed 
all of the evidence that they relied on to indicate, and anything else that they rely on to 
indicate that we are authorizing a particular computer . . . .” Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 156, at 65. 
 169 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at 23.  
 170 Id. at 24. Judge Friedman’s comments most likely relate to the issue of ongoing 
contempt hearings related to continued infringement even if an injunction issued. See 
supra Part I.B. (regarding Judge Friedman’s consideration of those issues in the initial 
post-trial injunction denial).  
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threat of an injunction in licensing negotiations.171 Pushing 
MercExchange as a troll, counsel further stated: “Justice 
Kennedy was alluding to it . . . that companies like 
MercExchange go around and they threaten litigation with their 
patents.”172 Since MercExchange had not proven “irreparable 
harm or inaccuracy of legal remedy,” there was no reason for an 
injunction.173  
Second, and during questions from Judge Friedman 
regarding “what harm would there be for . . . an injunction if 
[eBay] [is] no longer infringing [due to a design around],”174 
eBay’s counsel responded that the damage from an injunction “is 
a big thing to the public, to [eBay’s] investors.”175 Counsel went 
on to detail eBay’s position that despite allegedly designing 
around MercExchange’s patent, if an injunction were to issue, 
the financial damage to eBay’s investor perception, general 
business operations in the marketplace, and stock price, would 
likely be nonreversible. Regarding MercExchange’s potential 
harm, eBay’s counsel countered that if an injunction were denied 
at the district court and later reversed on appeal, or if eBay did 
not actually design around the patent and was later found as a 
continued infringer, the only harm to MercExchange would be 
time delay in damages recovery.176 Weighed with the two options 
in terms of greater risk, eBay’s counsel suggested to the court 
that “MercExchange does not have any products, any services, 
does not practice [the patent] . . . there is no evidence that any 
other entity practices this invention”—the greater harm under 
any circumstance would be to issue an injunction that 
permanently damages eBay’s business and takes the patent 
entirely out of the public marketplace.177 
3. The District Court’s Second Denial of a Permanent 
Injunction 
Judge Friedman issued his thirty-six page order and opinion 
denying MercExchange’s renewed motion for entry of a 
 
 171 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 156, at 20 (“And I suggest to Your Honor 
that they want to do that to create the undue leverage that Justice Kennedy talked 
about.”); see also id. at 63 (“That’s why they want [an injunction], because they want what 
Justice Kennedy cautioned against is illegitimate leverage.”). 
 172 Id. at 46. 
 173 Id. at 62. 
 174 Id. at 58. 
 175 Id. at 80. 
 176 Id. at 62–63 (“You do get the harm issue. And that’s like what would it harm Bill 
Gates if we asked him to give us $5 million? Probably nothing, right. But what would it 
harm eBay if you got out and say that we are enjoined and we can’t do this anymore? It 
does hurt. It hurts us in the marketplace.”). 
 177 Id. at 72–73. 
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permanent injunction on July 27, 2007. Detailed discussion of the 
opinion has already been provided by other scholars,178 but a few 
key points regarding the holding, and unique facts related to the 
parties, are worthy of mention. 
First, Judge Friedman lent much discussion to the separate 
concurrences within the Supreme Court opinion. There were 
three citation and discussion points regarding Chief Justice 
Roberts’ concurrence, and four citation and discussion points to 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.179 Regarding Chief Justice 
Roberts’ concurrence, Judge Friedman noted the historical 
frequency of a “plaintiff . . . establishing irreparable harm in the 
wake of establishing validity and infringement.” However, Judge 
Friedman distinguished the Chief Justice’s notions due to the 
Supreme Court majority holding “a permanent injunction shall 
only issue if plaintiff carries its burden of establishing 
that . . . the case specific facts warrant entry of an injunction.”180 
Regarding Chief Justice Roberts’ “page of history . . . worth a 
volume of logic” point, Judge Friedman rebutted:  
[W]hether the court is considering the injunction calculus, the 
likelihood that a criminal defendant with five prior felonies will be a 
recidivist, or whether a non-practicing patent holder with a track 
record for pursing monetary recovery through litigation is merely 
seeking an injunction as a bargaining chip to increase the bottom line. 
The factual history of this matter indicates that MercExchange has 
never sought to defend its right to exclude; to put credence in such 
claim at this late stage would not serve equity nor the public 
interest.181 
Conversely to the treatment of Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concurrence, Judge Friedman’s take on Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence was far more agreeable, if not precedential. Judge 
Friedman cited Justice Kennedy for the proposition that “if the 
application of the case specific facts to the four-factor test reveals 
that equitable relief is warranted, the nature of such [business 
method] patents may be considered by the court when balancing 
the equities.”182 He went on to cite Justice Kennedy for the 
proposition that “[u]tilization of a ruling in equity as a 
 
 178 See generally, e.g., Robert I. Reis, Rights and Remedies Post eBay 
v. MercExchange - Deep Waters Stirred, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 133 (2008). 
 179 See generally MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 
2007). In his opinion, Judge Friedman cited seven total times to the separate 
concurrences compared to ten total cites to the majority’s opinion. Id. 
 180 Id. at 569. 
 181 Id. at 588. 
 182 Id. at 574 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Reis, supra note 178, at 149 (citing this portion of 
Judge Friedman’s opinion in an “extended blend and tracking of notations” regarding the 
district court’s analysis of “‘irreparable harm’ and ‘adequate remedy at law’”).  
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bargaining chip suggests both that such party never deserved a 
ruling in equity and that money is all that such party truly seeks, 
rendering monetary damages an adequate remedy in the first 
instance.”183 Judge Friedman concluded on this 
stating: “Participation in such [patent licensing] industry lessens 
the impact of MercExchange’s plea for equitable relief . . . .”184 As 
other scholars have noted, “[There are] a number of issues 
regarding [Judge Friedman’s] use or abuse of discretion and 
conformity with the principles set forth in the [eBay] opinion and 
concurrence . . . of Justice Kennedy.”185 
Beyond discussion of the Supreme Court’s concurrences, a 
second point within the opinion was that Judge Friedman cited 
numerous case-specific facts, many of which were uncovered 
during the additional discovery after remand from the Supreme 
Court. These facts mentioned in the opinion all seemed to work 
against MercExchange’s motion for injunction. Judge Friedman’s 
notes include mention of emails between MercExchange’s 
founder and inventor, Tom Woolston, and the CEO of uBid, the 
eBay competitor which licensed MercExchange’s patents. Those 
emails, according to Judge Friedman,  
reveal that uBid chose to obtain the license [from MercExchange] in 
lieu of spending money ‘on a detailed legal opinion as to [the] patents 
and [their] impact on uBid’ . . . . [The uBid CEO] stated that ‘in 
return’ for a license to MercExchange’s patents he would ‘work 
directly with [Woolston] and [his] group to secure [their] eBay 
position’ and any other challenges.186 
Further emails from Woolston “indicate[] that such a [uBid 
content auction] website could likely be constructed but that 
Woolston should ‘do some upfront assessment of will this model 
work and can it make $. Otherwise, this is another make 
Friedman semi happy and piss away some $.’”187 To these 
exchanges, Judge Friedman concluded, “[T]he court recognizes 
that MercExchange’s negotiations with uBid appear just as likely 
to be an effort to placate the court as they do an effort to develop 
the ’265 patent.”188 Regarding MercExchange’s hedge fund 
investors discussed at length at oral argument, Judge Friedman’s 
opinion noted: 
 
 183 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)); see also Reis, supra note 178, at 150.  
 184 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 582; see also Reis, supra note 178, at 150. 
 185 Reis, supra note 178, at 151. 
 186 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 561–62. 
 187 Id. at 576–77. 
 188 Id. at 577. 
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Altitude Capital’s post-trial investment of $6.25 million in 
MercExchange . . . [was] to purchase an interest in MercExchange’s 
litigation recovery. . . . $4 million of such investment was distributed 
to MercExchange’s three members, and a large portion of the 
remainder was used to fund litigation[;] . . . little appears to have been 
devoted to developing the patents . . . .189  
Judge Friedman concluded, “[I]t nevertheless appears to 
represent a bypassed opportunity to attempt to develop 
MercExchange’s patents.”190 Finally, regarding the parties 
specifically, Judge Friedman described it as “a company of two 
employees, the inventor of the patents a former patent 
attorney”191 as compared to “eBay . . . a multibillion dollar 
corporation whose online marketplace brings together tens of 
millions of buyers and sellers around the world and eBay 
unquestionably has a substantial impact on the United States’ 
economy.”192 
A third point within the opinion was Judge Friedman’s 
emphasis on MercExchange’s ’265 patent being invalidated by 
the PTO and an injunction unnecessarily harming eBay. Judge 
Friedman stated there was a “distinct possibility that the ’265 
patent [would] be invalidated through reexamination as two PTO 
interim office actions rejected all claims . . . as obvious.”193 He 
went on to note that issuing an injunction against eBay would 
result in “irreparable harm . . . should the PTO later invalidate 
the ’265 patent” and that the “far more substantial risk of harm 
to eBay is the potential for eBay to lose customers if forced to 
remove the buy-it-now option from its website, potentially 
impeding millions of transactions, only to later discover that the 
’265 patent was never valid . . . .”194  
Lastly, Judge Friedman’s opinion analysis seemed to rest on 
MercExchange’s continued desire to not practice the 
patents-in-suit.195 Specifically, he noted “MercExchange has 
 
 189 Id. at 587 n.30. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 572. 
 192 Id. at 587 (suggesting that eBay may be “necessary to the public, such as medical 
devices”). 
 193 Id. at 591. Judge Friedman’s speculation was incorrect as within less than three 
months MercExchange’s ’265 patent was allowed by the PTO. Brief of Appellant at 52, 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 273 F. App’x 857 (2008) (No. 07–1531), 2007 WL 
3338911 at *52 (“In an October 2, 2007 Office Action, the PTO . . . has now confirmed the 
patentability of claims 1-25 of the ’265 Patent.”).  
 194 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 585. 
 195 See Reis, supra note 178, at 149–51; see also id. at 149 n.66 (contrasting the utility 
of self-made inventors or university researches with Judge Friedman’s analysis of 
MercExchange and noting “the majority of the utility achieved by [self-made inventor or 
university] licensing programs results from the fact that patent holders are still seeking to 
develop their patent, they are just opting to do so in partnership with others”); 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 11:45 AM 
714 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
virtually no presence in the online auction industry and has 
little, if any, name recognition, customer base, market share or 
licensing program spurring patent development.”196 In almost 
direct defiance of the Supreme Court majority opinion, Judge 
Friedman reasoned that despite “the Supreme Court’s 
admonishment to avoid categorical rules . . . [a plaintiff patent 
owner] offering a license to the defendant [patent 
infringer] . . . plainly weighs against a finding of irreparable 
harm as it illustrates the patent holder’s willingness to forgo his 
right to exclude.”197 
4. Judge Friedman and Other Patent Cases 
The seemingly strong lean of anti-patent holder sentiment 
regarding consideration of an injunction against eBay was 
perhaps standard anti-patent holder practice in Judge 
Friedman’s courtroom. A review of the forty cases assigned to 
him while on the bench (November 1997 to August 2011) reveals 
a strong disfavor of patent holders. While eBay was the longest 
patent case pending before Judge Friedman,198 of the other 
twelve cases pending for over 300 days on his docket,199 four were 
cases concluded through summary judgment of 
non-infringement,200 and eight cases were dismissed without 
substantive opinion.201 No case decided by Judge Friedman could 
arguably be characterized as in favor of a patent owner.  
 
Venkatesan, supra note 125, at 43 (“There could not be a clearer exposition and adoption 
of the Second Circuit’s doctrine of denying nonpracticing patentees’ monopoly rents from 
their patents.”). 
 196 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Reis, supra note 178, at 149 (concluding 
that Judge Friedman’s listing of these factors constituted key elements in his 
consideration of injunction relief). 
 197 MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
 198 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., No. 2:01-cv-00736, Dkt. at 1, 763 (E.D. Va 
2007) (MercExchange’s complaint was filed on Sept. 26, 2001, (Dkt. 1) and ended on Feb. 
28, 2008, with an agreed order dismissing case (Dkt. 763), totaling 2841 days of 
litigation). 
 199 Cummins Eagle, Inc. v. Bakery Holdings, No. 2:98-cv-00945 (E.D. Va. 1998); Jacob 
v. Columbia-Arlington, No. 2:98-cv-01474 (E.D. Va. 1998); Bell-Atlantic Net. v. Covad 
Commc’ns, No. 2:99-cv-00712 (E.D. Va. 1999); Fantasy Sports v. Sportsline.Com, Inc., No. 
2:99-cv-02131 (E.D. Va. 1999); Fantasy Sports v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 2:00-cv-00179 
(E.D. Va. 2000); Microstrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S., No. 2:01-cv-00826 (E.D. Va. 2001); 
Nystrom v. Trex Co., No. 2:01-cv-00905 (E.D. Va. 2001); Colt Def. L.L.C. v. Heckler 
& Koch Def., Inc., No. 2:04-cv-00258 (E.D. Va. 2004); AU Optronics v. Sharp Corp., No. 
2:04-cv-00333 (E.D. Va. 2004); Audio MPEG, Inc. v. Creative Labs, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-00185 
(E.D. Va. 2005); Bid for Position, L.L.C. v. AOL, L.L.C., No. 2:07-cv-00582 (E.D. Va. 2007); 
Osmose, Inc. v. Arch Chem., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00108 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 200 Bell-Atlantic, No. 2:99-cv-00712; Microstrategy, No. 2:01-cv-00826; Nystrom, No. 
2:01-cv-00905; Bid for Position, No. 2:07-cv-00582; see also Dynamic Brands, L.L.C. v. Sun 
Mountain Sports, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00244 (E.D. Va. 2008) (an additional decision adverse 
to the patent holder but related to ownership of the patent itself, was only pending for 
eighty-two days, and was voluntarily dismissed). 
 201 Cummins Eagle, No. 2:98-cv-00945; Jacob, No. 2:98-cv-01474; Fantasy Sports, No. 
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5. Procedural Notes and Press Before Second Federal Circuit 
Appeal 
Before the second Federal Circuit appeal, and case 
settlement, it is important to note one procedural point, and one 
press communications point. Regarding case procedure, after 
Judge Friedman’s July 2007 denial of MercExchange’s renewed 
request for an injunction, MercExchange immediately motioned 
the court for post-verdict accounting and bond.202 In turn, eBay 
motioned the court for judgment as a matter of law or new trial 
on the ’265 patent, and summary judgment that eBay’s current 
operations do not infringe.203 In December 2007, Judge Friedman 
issued an order granting MercExchange’s motion to certify the 
judgment and ordering the clerk of court to enter judgment in the 
amount of $25 million, with interest, on the ’265 patent.204 
Accordingly, eBay posted a bond in the amount of $31 million on 
December 19, 2007.205 
Regarding press communications, in contrast to the active 
release of communications at the time leading up to the Supreme 
Court decision, and regarding the Supreme Court decision, eBay 
did not issue any press releases regarding Judge Friedman’s 
denial of the renewed motion for injunction in July 2007. The 
first post-Supreme Court press communication came from eBay 
in December 2007, when Judge Friedman entered judgment on 
the ’265 patent. In that release, eBay stated: 
We are disappointed with the court’s order and we plan to appeal 
it. . . . [T]he court concluded that it did not have the legal right to 
consider the merits of our arguments concerning the ’265 patent, but 
rather was required to reject our motions based on the procedural 
posture of the case. . . . Additionally, our motion for summary 
judgment that our 2003 design-around was effective and there is no 
ongoing infringement of the ’265 patent, and that no further damages 
are due, also remains pending before the court. We remain pleased 
with other developments in this ongoing case, including the decision 
by the United States Court of Appeals to invalidate another patent in 
 
2:99-cv-02131; Fantasy Sports, No. 2:00-cv-00179; Colt, No. 2:04-cv-00258; AU Optronics, 
No. 2:04-cv-00333; Audio MPEG, No. 2:05-cv-00185; Osmose, No. 2:10-cv-00108. 
 202 Motion for Post-Verdict Accounting by MercExchange, L.L.C., MercExchange, 500 
F. Supp. 2d 556 (ECF No. 696); Motion for Bond by eBay, Inc., Half.com, Inc., 
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (ECF No. 699). 
 203  Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or for New Trial on 256 Patent by eBay, 
Inc., Half.com, Inc., MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (ECF No. 706); Motion for 
Summary Judgment that Defendants’ Current Operations Do Not Infringe by eBay, Inc., 
Half.com, Inc., MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (ECF No. 708). 
 204  Order Granting 693 Motion to Certify the Judgment Under FRCP 54(b), 
MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (ECF No. 752); Judgment on the 265 Patent Under 
FRCP 54(b), MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (ECF No. 759). 
 205 Supersedeas Bond in the Amount of $31 Million, MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 
556 (ECF No. 761). 
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this case; the May 2006 unanimous Supreme Court decision in eBay’s 
favor on MercExchange’s request for an injunction; and the District 
Court’s subsequent affirmation in September 2007 that no injunction 
is called for.206 
B.  Second Appeal to the Federal Circuit and Settlement 
The eBay litigation, lasting through trial, appeal—including 
to the Supreme Court—and then on remand and a second appeal, 
was a great anomaly for any patent case.207 Federal Circuit 
briefing on Judge Friedman’s denial of MercExchange’s renewed 
motion for permanent injunction occurred between October and 
December 2007.208 No new legal arguments were made during 
the briefing; however, there was much discussion regarding the 
October 2007 PTO post-KSR209 office action allowing claims one 
through twenty-five of the ’265 patent.210 Indeed, Judge 
Friedman was incorrect in his assumption that the ’265 patent 
would soon be invalidated by the PTO. Sometime after briefing, 
likely January 2008, the case was referred to the Federal 
Circuit’s mediation office.211 Settlement of the case was 
announced February 28, 2008, when eBay released the following 
statement: 
eBay Inc. announced today that it has agreed to a settlement with 
MercExchange, L.L.C. to dismiss all claims and appeals stemming 
from the patent lawsuit filed by MercExchange in September of 
2001 . . . As part of the settlement, eBay will purchase all three 
patents involved in the lawsuit, as well as some additional related 
technology and inventions and a license to another search-related 
patent portfolio that was not asserted in the lawsuit. These assets will 
allow eBay to further enhance its operations and trust and safety 
efforts on its ecommerce sites . . . [eBay Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel stated] “In addition to resolving the litigation, this 
 
 206 eBay Inc. Statement on District Court Ruling in MercExchange v. eBay Case, EBAY 
INC. (Dec. 12, 2007), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/0x0x151224/fdee3cd4-38fc-
4a75-ad79-aee05ea38b64/EBAY_News_2007_12_12_General.pdf. 
 207 See Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 375, 381 (2014) (discussing studies of patent case settlements and noting that the 
vast majority of patent suits settle, patent cases that do settle generally involve the most 
litigated patents, and cases that do not settle generally result in a patent being 
invalidated; none of these factors can be found in the eBay litigation).  
 208 Brief of Appellant, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 
07-1531), 2007 WL 3338911 (on file with author); Brief of Defendants, MercExchange, 500 
F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 07-1531), 2007 WL 4618645 (on file with author); Reply Brief of 
Appellant, MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (No. 07-1531), 2007 WL 4984843 (on file 
with author).  
 209 The Supreme Court decision in KSR was issued April 30, 2007. KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 210 Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 208, at 13. 
 211 Memorandum from Michael Morthland for Professor Ryan T. Holte regarding 
communications with the Federal Circuit records office (Oct. 28, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
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settlement gives us access to additional intellectual property that will 
help improve and further secure our marketplaces.”212 
While the settlement details are confidential between the 
parties, it has been confirmed that eBay purchased all patents 
owned by MercExchange and continued to prosecute pending 
MercExchange patent applications.213 Further, after a review of 
eBay’s quarterly SEC earnings filings, it appears that the total 
settlement amount could likely have been somewhere between 
the $31 million bond amount and $55 million.214 
While the confidential reasons for case settlement are only 
known to the parties, the February 2008 timing can likely be 
explained. First, given the Federal Circuit’s previous treatment 
of the case, with almost automatic reversal of Judge Friedman’s 
injunction denial, it was likely the Federal Circuit would again 
reverse Judge Friedman. Beyond specific errors in his reasoning 
that would potentially result in any patent-owner-licensor being 
denied an injunction215 (at a minimum in violation of the eBay 
Court’s affirmance of Continental Paper Bag), the Federal 
Circuit’s treatment of permanent injunction appeals post-eBay 
has not likely changed. While additional comprehensive research 
into post-eBay injunction appeals at the Federal Circuit is 
needed—and forthcoming216—review of the fifty-two Federal 
Circuit injunction appeals applying the eBay analysis reveals 
nine appeals where a district court denied entry of a permanent 
injunction,217 with the Federal Circuit affirming on only two 
occasions, both related to medical devices.218  
 
 212 eBay Inc. and MercExchange, L.L.C. Reach Settlement Agreement, EBAY INC. (Feb. 
28, 2008), http://investor.ebay.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=296670. 
 213 Holte, supra note 4, at 29−30.  
 214 The $31 million to $55 million settlement range was calculated as follows. The $31 
million bond posted to the district court was returned to eBay on February 29, 2008. 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., No. 2:01-cv-00736, Dkt. 763 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
According to eBay’s SEC filings, between December 31, 2007, and March 31, 2008, eBay 
general and administrative operating costs increased in the amount of $76,903,000. That 
is roughly a $25 million increase over the next two quarters’ increases of $50 million and 
$44 million. See SEC Filings, EBAY INC. (last visited April 11, 2015), http://investor. 
ebayinc.com/sec.cfm?view=all. By conjecture, a weak conclusion can be drawn that the 
$25 million increase was partially due to a MercExchange settlement disbursement added 
to the previously paid and returned $31 million bond amount (the original jury award 
with interest). This is only conjecture based on publicly available information; the true 
settlement amount could have been paid in future installments, or some other means that 
cannot be independently verified.  
 215 Reis, supra note 178, at 149−51 (2008); Venkatesan, supra note 125, at 43 (“There 
could not be a clearer exposition and adoption of the Second Circuit’s doctrine of denying 
nonpracticing patentees’ monopoly rents from their patents.”). 
 216 This author and Chris Seaman, Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee 
University School of Law, are currently compiling data on all Federal Circuit permanent 
injunction appeals post-eBay and plan to release their data and findings in the fall of 
2015. 
 217 Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 
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A second likely reason supporting the pre-Federal Circuit 
opinion timing of the settlement is that any strategy by eBay to 
delay until MercExchange ran out of litigation funds was likely 
thwarted by the ’265 patent claims being allowed at the PTO and 
a district-court-held bond of $31 million seemingly locked in the 
future for MercExchange. As Judge Friedman’s opinion detailed, 
over $6 million had already been invested by one hedge fund 
before patent allowance and bond posting; after those 
benchmarks, it is likely MercExchange’s attractiveness to 
litigation investors would only increase. 
Third, and discussed in greater detail infra, eBay likely 
found value in its public efforts for the Supreme Court opinion to 
appear as an affirmance of Judge Friedman’s initial denial of 
MercExchange’s request for injunction, a much broader reversal 
of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, and an image of Justice 
Kennedy’s separate concurrence as the takeaway future law 
against any non-practicing patent owner. To this end, eBay likely 
preferred Judge Friedman’s denial of MercExchange’s renewed 
motion for a permanent injunction as the last opinion in the case, 
and likely placed great value in the Federal Circuit not creating 
adverse precedent in reversing Judge Friedman a second time. 
III. WHAT THE EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE OPINION HAS  
COME TO MEAN 
Despite the unanimous Supreme Court opinion 
characterizing eBay as merely following “well-established 
principles of equity,”219 the “opinion has had cataclysmic 
effect . . . a remarkable legal juggernaut.”220 Fewer than five 
years after the opinion was issued, “eBay had been cited more 
than 4,100 times. Before eBay, courts presumed irreparable 
injury in intellectual property cases on the ground that damages 
 
569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Robert Bosch L.L.C. v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Whitserve, L.L.C. v. Computer Packages Inc., 694 F.3d 10 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
Douglas Dynamics, L.L.C. v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Apple Inc. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 218 The patents in Voda and Bard Peripheral Vascular are both related to medical 
devices. The Bard decision relied on a strong public interest allowing market competition 
between the parties. Bard Peripheral, 670 F.3d at 1192 (affirming the district court’s 
“finding that it was in the public interest to allow competition in the medical device 
arena”). Voda held the patent owner improperly argued irreparable injury on the part of 
its exclusive licensee instead of itself. Voda, 536 F.3d at 1329 (“Voda had attempted to 
prove irreparable injury by alleging irreparable harm to his exclusive licensee, rather 
than himself.”). 
 219 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 220 Gergen et al., supra note 2, at 205–06. 
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in such cases are notoriously difficult to measure. Now courts are 
split on whether any such presumption is permissible.”221 During 
hearings before the FTC, one university research professor, 
inventor of over twenty-five patents, and founder of numerous 
technology startups stated:  
[E]ven though the ruling in eBay may not have expressly commanded 
that one looks at whether it’s a practicing or non-practicing entity to 
decide whether they’re entitled to enjoin the infringer . . . the reality 
is . . . courts understand the eBay decision to actually mean that. That 
is if you’re a licensor and do not practice, your ability today to have a 
meaningful power in the negotiation is greatly diminished . . . .222  
A.  Fewer Permanent Injunctions Granted Post-eBay  
Looking at empirical case data post-eBay, the rate of 
permanent injunctions in patent infringement disputes has 
changed dramatically. A sampling of district court permanent 
injunction decisions between May 2003 and May 2005, just prior 
to eBay, revealed between 0% and 6% of patentee motions for 
injunction denied.223 In great contrast, sampling district courts 
after the eBay decision, between 2006 and 2011, reveals 25% to 
40% of patentee motions for injunctions denied.224 Indeed, in the 
most recent and comprehensive study of the 217 district court 
permanent injunction decisions post-eBay, Professor Chris 
Seaman finds permanent injunctions were granted in only 158 
cases—or a denial rate of 27.2%—where the parties contested the 
issue.225 In short, post-eBay injunction denial rates have, at a 
minimum, quadrupled.226 
 
 221 LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 427. 
 222 Ron Katznelson, Hearing on the Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP 
Markets, Remarks at the Federal Trade Commission 5, 62 (Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter 
Hearning on the Evolving IP Marketplace], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/public_events/evolving-ip-marketplace/09 0318transcript.pdf. 
 223 Eric Maughan, Protecting the Rights of Inventors: How Natural Rights Theory 
Should Influence the Injunction Analysis in Patent Infringement Cases, 10 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 215, 224 (2012); Benjamin Simler & Scott McClelland, A Model for 
Predicting Permanent Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange, BLOOMBERG LAW 
REPORTS 1 (2011) (finding in the year prior to eBay 100% of the courts to consider 
permanent injunctions granted the injunction). 
 224 Maughan, supra note 223; Simler & McClelland, supra note 223 (finding 
injunctions granted only 60% of the time between the years 2006 and 2010). 
 225 See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Property Rules vs. Liability Rules in Patent 
Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study (forthcoming 2015). The percentage of total 
contested permanent injunctions granted by district courts from May 15, 2006 (date of 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange) through December 31, 2013 is 72.8% 
(158 of 217 cases). The 217 cases include one case where the district court denied motions 
for permanent injunctions by both plaintiff and defendant/counterclaim plaintiff. This 
figure is in line with previous studies. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Holdups, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (finding an 
injunction rate of 75% for cases through December 2011); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE 
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH 
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For patentees that do not practice the patents they own, the 
rates for injunctions are even lower post-eBay. Professor 
Seaman’s recent study found competition in the marketplace to 
be an important consideration in deciding whether a given 
patentee would receive an injunction against an infringer.227 
Others have found that “when courts [find] no direct competition 
between the plaintiff [patentee] and infringer, they denied 
permanent injunctions in more than half [] of the cases.”228 
Professor Seaman’s study found where parties were not market 
competitors, injunctions were denied in 78.4% of cases (29 of 37 
cases), and for non-practicing entities (which MercExchange was 
classified as), injunctions were denied in 84.0% of cases (21 of 25 
cases).229 For inventors and patent owners who do not themselves 
manufacture or otherwise produce a product related to their 
patent, the opportunity for preventing another from using the 
patent was almost completely destroyed by the eBay decision.230 
Finally, as many industries are beginning to realize, the 
eBay injunction analysis, and change in rate of injunctions, is 
beginning to reach far beyond just patent infringement cases. 
“[F]ederal courts now commonly accept the eBay test as the test 
for injunctions in virtually all types of cases, from constitutional 
challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to actions under various 
federal regulatory or antidiscrimination statues, to diversity 
actions centered on state tort, contract, or statutory law.”231 For 
these areas of the law, following eBay precedent with district 
courts reviewing patent injunction issues, courts have similarly 
reduced presumptions in favor of injunctions, “including 
presumptions that continuing rights violations entail irreparable 
 
COMPETITION 217 (2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-
federaltrade/110307patentreport.pdf (reporting an injunction rate of 72% to 77%). 
 226 Maughan, supra note 223. 
 227 See generally Seaman, supra note 225. Percentage of cases where district court 
granted permanent injunction when the parties competed in a product market during the 
term of at least one patent-in-suit: 83.3% (150 of 180 cases). If Hatch-Waxman cases are 
excluded from this tally, the grant rate is slightly lower: 81.4% (127 of 156 cases). Id. 
 228 Douglas Ellis et al., Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining 
Permanent Injunctive Relief after eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 442–43 
(2008); see also d’Incelli, supra note 13, at 360 (“Plaintiffs who were awarded injunctions 
tended to practice their patents and functioned as market competitors with the 
defendants.”). 
 229 See generally Seaman, supra note 225. Percentage of cases where district court 
granted permanent injunction when the parties were not market competitors: 21.6% (8 of 37 
cases). Id. 
 230 An important point regarding many patent owners who do not practice the 
patents they own is that they very likely formerly practiced the patents they owned. See 
Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 435, 440 (2014). 
 231 Gergen et al., supra note 2, at 215. 
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injury.”232 After eBay, the ability to receive an injunction in all 
areas of the law has been reduced dramatically.  
B.  Courts Improperly Using Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence as 
Precedent 
One reason for the change in jurisprudence regarding 
issuance of permanent injunctions post-eBay, is that district 
court judges are citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to support 
holdings that deny injunctions.233 As other scholars have noted, 
“[p]luralities and concurrences” can often times result in 
“vagueness and uncertainty that . . . leave[s] us wondering what 
the controlling rule is . . . .”234 The eBay precedent seems to be 
just that situation. 
In reviewing post-eBay injunction cases, many other scholars 
have concluded “a review of post-eBay federal district court 
decisions shows that though it is not the opinion of the Court, 
[Justice] Kennedy’s concurrence has proven to be highly 
persuasive.”235 Specifically to non-practicing patentees, the 
“increase in denied injunctions to NPEs reflects a reliance by 
many courts upon Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay 
and its general disapproval of NPEs.”236 “District courts have 
responded in apparent lockstep to Justice Kennedy’s concerns 
about trolls.”237 And as found empirically regarding competition 
as the greatest factor in injunction denials, “focusing on direct 
competition [between parties in patent injunction decisions] is 
really a proxy for focusing on a firm’s status as an NPE.”238 
Finally, dismissing the notion that courts are potentially placing 
 
 232 Id. at 216. 
 233 Despite there not being a “swing vote” with a unanimous opinion on the eBay 
injunction issue, perhaps there is some conformity to be found in Justice Kennedy’s 
singular control of the law in yet another case. 
 234 Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony 
of Concurrences, and Re-percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 301 
(2008) (discussing the confusion over Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos, among 
other things, and noting that justices are increasingly becoming aware of the power they 
can hold in shaping the law where they cannot otherwise garner a majority in support of 
their view).  
 235 Venkatesan, supra note 125, at 30. In support of this, some non-patent scholars 
actually think it is best when courts consider Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. LAYCOCK, 
supra note 2 (“The only hint of what should have been the real issue in eBay comes in the 
penultimate paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.”). 
 236 Maughan, supra note 223, at 225. 
 237 John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 
(2007); see also Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay 
v. MercExchange, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 235, 246 n.91 (2006) (discussing Judge Davis’ 
opinion in z4 Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006) and stating 
“Judge Davis quoted Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay stating that ‘legal 
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement’”(citation omitted)). 
 238 Maughan, supra note 223, at 225. 
Do Not Delete 6/6/2015 11:45 AM 
722 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
equal weight or discussion to Justice Roberts’ “historical” 
concurrence discussion, one scholar reviewing district courts 
denying permanent injunctions found “[a]lthough several of the 
courts cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence . . . none have cited 
Justice Roberts’ concurrence . . . .”239 
Another important point regarding the growth of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence as precedent for eBay injunction analysis 
is that many early district courts citing Justice Kennedy, and 
denying injunctions, are themselves being “widely cited by 
subsequent district courts.”240 Simply looking at citations to 
Judge Friedman’s 2007 denial of MercExchange’s renewed 
motion for injunction reveals at least thirteen citations within 
cases considering permanent injunctions for unrelated patent 
infringement cases.241 While these cases themselves are not 
 
 239 Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 193, 197 (2008). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04C5312, 2008 WL 4531371, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008) (“The eBay district court, along with numerous other courts, has 
since decided that no presumption can exist under relevant case law and the language of 
the Supreme Court’s decision.”); Joyal Products, Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-
5712(JAP), 2009 WL 512156, at *11 (D. N.J. Feb. 27, 2009) (citing Judge Friedman’s order 
to distinguish an entity who largely licenses their patents for the utilization of the 
patent); Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0485, 2010 WL 
817519, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Judge Friedman’s opinion that the public 
interest factor favors the patentee in interest of maintaining the integrity of the patent 
system); Enpat, Inc. v. Budnic, No. 6:11-cv-86-PCF-KRS, 2011 WL 1196420, at *3 (M.D. 
Fl. Mar. 29, 2011) (“However, ‘the [c]ourt is not blind to the reality that the nature of the 
right protected by a patent, the right to exclude, will frequently result in a plaintiff 
successfully establishing irreparable harm in the wake of establishing validity and 
infringement.’” (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. 
Va. 2007))); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09CV620, 2011 WL 2119410, at *6 
(E.D. Va. May 23, 2011) (explaining that ePlus’ first burden is to demonstrate irreparable 
harm); Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., 788 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 
(E.D. N.Y. 2011) (“On remand from the Supreme Court, [the district court] declin[ed] to 
grant injunctive relief where it appeared that the patent holder was ‘merely seeking an 
injunction as a bargaining chip to increase the bottom line.’” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. 
Supp. 2d at 588)); Belden Techs., Inc. v. Superior Essex Commc’ns LP, 802 F. Supp. 2d 
555, 578 (D. Del. 2011) (differentiating entities who use third-party licensing to bring 
concepts to market, and “excis[ing] a tax from companies already participating in the 
market” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583 n.24)); ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. 
v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648 (E.D. Va. 2011) (comparing the 
plaintiff to MercExchange, who both use their patents to threaten litigation in order to 
negotiate the maximum value of a license), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 694 
F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d 
1104, 1117 (D. Kan. 2012) (noting that “irreparable harm had not been shown in part 
because the patentee had consistently licensed the patent instead of engaging in 
commercial activity in practicing the patent” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 
570–71)); ePlus Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (E.D. Va. 2013) 
(noting the overlap between the factors of adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm), 
vacated 760 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Interlace Med., Inc., 955 
F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 (D. Mass. 2012) (explaining that the PTOs preliminary rejection of the 
patents weakens the plaintiff’s ability to show irreparable harm); Open Text, S.A. v. Box, 
Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 885, 906. (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“[C]ase law is clear that the potential for 
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necessarily citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as precedent 
directly, as discussed supra, Judge Friedman’s reasoning to deny 
an injunction was certainly in favor of following Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence as precedent. 
One final point regarding the precedential citation of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay injunction jurisprudence is that 
the trend does not seem to be influencing Federal Circuit 
decisions. Of the fifty-two Federal Circuit cases reviewing 
appeals of permanent injunctions since eBay, only two cases cite 
to Justice Kennedy, and one of those cases, Robert Bosch LLC 
v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., cites to Justice Kennedy for 
comparison regarding the facts of that case being clearly 
distinguishable from Justice Kennedy’s concerns in eBay.242 
Further, if any concurrence-following conclusion can be drawn 
from Federal Circuit citations, it would actually be in the four 
post-eBay cites to Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence, noting his 
discussion of the historical practice before analyzing the 
injunction factors. For example: “the analysis by the district 
court proceeds under the ‘long tradition of equity practice’ 
granting ‘injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the 
vast majority of patent cases.’”243 “This analysis proceeds with an 
eye to the ‘long tradition of equity practice’ granting ‘injunctive 
relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of 
patent cases.’”244 As discussed supra, additional comprehensive 
research into post-eBay injunction appeals at the Federal Circuit 
is needed, and forthcoming.245 Preliminary data suggests, 
however, that the change in jurisprudence found in district 
courts, and using Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as injunction 
precedent, is not mirrored in Federal Circuit post-eBay injunction 
jurisprudence.  
C.  Public Perception of Patent Injunctions Post-eBay: No 
Injunctions Allowed 
As discussed previously, during the time immediately 
surrounding the eBay case pending before the Supreme Court, 
 
loss of market share is insufficient.”). 
 242 Robert Bosch L.L.C. v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 243 Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 244 Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). The other two Federal Circuit cases citing Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence 
are Robert Bosch L.L.C., 659 F.3d, at 1149 and Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 
582 F.3d 1288, 1302 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 245 This author and Professor Chris Seaman are currently compiling data on all 
Federal Circuit permanent injunction appeals post-eBay and plan to release their data 
and findings in the fall of 2015. 
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and after, “17% of all [patent case] related news and editorial 
items in [newspapers] . . . included the negative message that 
‘patents are (and shouldn’t be) awarded to/enforceable by those 
who don’t develop products/practice the invention.’ This was the 
most prevalent ‘message’ – positive or negative – in” patent 
case-related news at the time.246 Further, as discussed supra, 
during the time eBay litigation was pending through the courts, 
eBay systematically worked to create a public image that 
expanded their “win” in the Supreme Court majority opinion: 
 From eBay’s press release when the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion:  
eBay . . . applauds today’s Supreme Court decision . . . . eBay 
argued that trial judges ought to have the discretion—
expressly granted by Congress—to award money damages to 
patent owners, instead of injunctions, if the facts of a 
particular case warrant it. The Supreme Court agreed with 
eBay that the injunction rule applied by the Federal Circuit 
was unduly narrow. “We are extremely gratified by the 
Supreme Court’s unanimous decision,” . . . “The trial judge 
originally found in this case that money was sufficient, and 
denied an injunction. We are confident that when the 
District Court revisits this issue . . . the result will be the 
same.”247 
 From eBay’s press release when Judge Friedman entered 
judgment: “We remain pleased with other developments 
in this ongoing case, including . . . the May 2006 
unanimous Supreme Court decision in eBay’s favor on 
MercExchange’s request for an injunction; and the 
District Court’s subsequent affirmation in September 
2007 that no injunction is called for.”248 
 
 246 Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 140, at 28. The study conducted focuses on news 
related to the NTP case; however, the press coverage between that case and eBay during 
the time period cannot be distinguished:  
Given the characteristics in common between the two cases, we wanted to show 
what a consumer of major newspaper content might have experienced from the 
NTP-related coverage, in terms of quantity and quality, at and around the time 
that the Supreme Court was deciding to hear – and deciding – the eBay case. 
For this purpose, we regarded the coverage as monolithic, because we assumed 
that even a sophisticated reader with a particular interest in the NTP case 
would not systematically distinguish between pertinent news and editorial 
coverage. Rather, we assumed that an interested reader would read every 
NTP-related item in the paper or papers he/she reviewed in a routine, 
unexceptional fashion, i.e., along with other items of interest to the reader in 
those paper(s), as he/she happened upon them in casual fashion.  
Id. at 10. 
 247 See supra Part I.C.4. 
 248 See supra Part II.A.5. 
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 Even eBay’s press release regarding the Federal Circuit’s 
decision to stay its mandate pending the Supreme Court’s 
review of the writ of certiorari: “In granting eBay’s 
petition to stay the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
considered whether there was both a reasonable 
probability that the Supreme Court would accept eBay’s 
appeal and a fair prospect that the majority of the 
Supreme Court would reverse one or more rulings 
against eBay.”249 
After consideration of such misleading press releases by a 
huge consumer-direct company, it’s no great surprise that even 
when eBay finally settled with MercExchange, press coverage 
continued to echo eBay’s Supreme Court “win” and the end of 
non-practicing patentee injunctions. From CNET News February 
2008: 
The terms of the settlement announced Thursday are 
confidential . . . . eBay appealed th[e] decision all the way to the 
Supreme Court, which ruled in its favor in spring 2006. The justices 
issued a landmark decision last May designed to make it more 
difficult for patent holders to get courts to sign off on shutoffs of 
infringing products.250  
From the Wall Street Journal February 2008:  
Plaintiffs had all but automatically been granted injunctions in patent 
cases, giving them strong leverage in pressing for large payments 
from defendants. The Supreme Court in May 2006 issued a ruling that 
put some limits on the practice, stating that judges should weigh such 
factors as the public interest in deciding whether to grant 
injunctions.251 
Indeed, there was never any popular media coverage related to 
portions of the Supreme Court opinion regarding the affirmance 
of Continental Paper Bag, the reversal of Judge Friedman’s 
initial denial of MercExchange’s request for injunction, or Chief 
 
 249 See supra Part I.B. 
 250 Anne Broache, eBay, MercExchange End ‘Buy it Now’ Patent Feud, CNET NEWS 
(Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.cnet.com/news/ebay-mercexchange-end-buy-it-now-patent-
feud/. 
 251 Don Clark, EBay Ends Patent Fight with MercExchange, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 29, 
2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120422344163500365; see also Susan Decker 
& Oliver Staley, eBay Agrees to Settle ‘Buy It Now’ Patent Lawsuit (Update4), BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ao 
OIDXjUOi8A (“On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ended patent owners’ automatic right 
to block use of infringing products. . . . Since then, judges throughout the U.S. have denied 
such orders in cases where the patent owner is not a competitor of the company making 
the infringing products.”); Mark Schwanhausser, EBay Patent Case Settled, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.mercurynews.com/breakingnews/ci_8397551 
(“eBay took its case to the Supreme Court, where it prevailed. . . . Woolston also was 
derided as a ‘patent troll’ . . . .”). 
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Justice Roberts’ concurrence in contrast to Justice Kennedy’s. 
Summarizing the media reports, it’s no great surprise that to the 
average member of the public, technology entrepreneur, 
corporate executive, and even some district court judges, “if 
you’re a licensor and do not practice, your ability today to have a 
meaningful power in the negotiation [of a patent business 
transaction] is greatly diminished . . . one looks at whether it’s a 
practicing or non-practicing entity to decide whether the [entity 
is] entitled to enjoin the infringer.”252 
IV. MISINTERPRETATION OF EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE AND WHY 
“Precedent’s power in the legal system relies on it carrying a 
weight” without confusion and often times “pluralities and 
concurrences are contributory factors in that confusion.”253 The 
eBay majority opinion was neither meant to change the law of 
injunctions nor serve as the ultimate test for injunction analysis. 
“Alternative language in eBay, especially the Court’s concluding 
disclaimer, suggests that a humbler reach for the opinion was 
intended.”254 Looking back at the eBay majority opinion, with the 
MercExchange v. eBay litigation facts and procedure in hand, 
reveals important points in understanding the opinion’s true 
holding and precedent. 
A.  The Holding of eBay’s Unanimous Majority Opinion Has 
Been Lost  
Looking at the eBay case facts and procedure, it is important 
to first note that the parties did not dispute the factors courts 
should consider when analyzing permanent injunction issues in 
patent cases. Indeed, both MercExchange in its opening brief 
requesting an injunction in 2003, and eBay in its brief in 
opposition, cited and discussed the four equitable factors courts 
 
 252 Hearing on the Evolving IP Marketplace, supra note 222, at 52. Perhaps one 
reason for public sentiment against non-practicing patent owners receiving injunctions is 
that public perception favors that courts apply the doctrine of accession to equitable 
determinations in patent cases for “substantially improving” infringers. For further 
discussion of the doctrine of accession applied to equitable patent remedies, see Peter Lee, 
The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 218–19 
(2011) (“eBay itself already embraces this notion of comparing the relative values of 
patented inventions and accused products. . . . which compels courts to compare the 
relative values of an underlying patent and a broader, infringing technology when 
determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.”). 
 253 Berkolow, supra note 234, at 313–14. 
 254 Gergen et al., supra note 2, at 219 (citing the Supreme Court’s “disclaimer” within 
the unanimous opinion). “We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny 
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such 
discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent 
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.” eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
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should consider when deciding an injunction.255 After the initial 
denial of the injunction, the disputed injunction issues focused on 
(1) Judge Friedman’s seemingly categorical denial of injunctions 
for business method patents or patentees that do not practice 
their patents, and (2) Judge Friedman’s inappropriate discussion 
of MercExchange not seeking a preliminary injunction or the 
likelihood of eBay filing multiple contempt hearings should an 
injunction issue.256 After the Federal Circuit opinion, and 
reversal of Judge Friedman, the Supreme Court’s disputed 
injunction matters focused on one completely different issue—
whether the Federal Circuit erred in not considering the four 
equitable factors but instead citing a “general rule” that 
injunctions should issue.257 
The unanimous Supreme Court opinion holds only three 
main conclusions that are clearly pronounced once placed into 
perspective within the earlier case facts and litigation history. 
First, the district court erred in discussing expansive principles 
related to MercExchange that would result in injunctions not 
issuing in a broad swath of cases. Second, the Federal Circuit 
erred in not applying the traditional four-part equitable test but 
instead citing a “general rule” that injunctions should issue once 
validity and infringement have been adjudged. Third, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Continental Paper Bag case and 
explicitly said that injunctions may issue to patent owners who 
“unreasonably decline[]” to use the patents they own.258  
Understanding the unanimous Supreme Court opinion, 
especially as it applies to Judge Friedman’s first denial of an 
injunction, highlights that the Supreme Court rejected any 
injunction analysis that would result in a broad class of patent 
owners, or patents, being denied injunctive relief. Further, any 
discussion within Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that lends to a 
conclusion opposite that of the unanimous Court is of no 
precedential value. While we might never know what Justice 
Kennedy’s intent was with his concurrence as it relates to the 
Court’s opinion, the use of the concurrence to hold a conclusion in 
conflict with the Court’s unanimous opinion is entirely 
 
 255 See supra Part I.A. 
 256 See supra Part I.B.  
 257 See supra Part I.C.3.  
 258 See supra Part I.C (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94). Beyond the Supreme Court’s 
own words in the unanimous opinion requiring a narrow reading of the conclusions, the 
Court’s discussion and contemplation of the broader issues at oral argument enunciates 
the notion that the unanimous opinion did not seek to change law regarding the “business 
method” or “patent troll” issues belabored at oral argument. Even Chief Justice Roberts’ 
skepticisms of the patent’s complexity at oral argument were not part of any later written 
holding or concurrence by the Court. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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inappropriate, and “problems arise when subsequent courts are 
confused.”259 Further supporting the intended weakness of 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is his self-description of it as mere 
“observations,” and the single cite included to support the 
statements—an online FTC report summarizing testimony from 
a panel discussion regarding the computer hardware industry.260 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s opinion, when placed into perspective 
with the case history and procedure, was most likely a 
thought-drop in time for a future case and Court to consider, not 
the spark to an anti-non-practicing entity conflagration resulting 
in an 84% drop in injunction grants for those patent owners.261  
B.  The eBay v. MercExchange Dispute Had Many Complications 
Resulting in Bad Precedent for Patent Injunctions 
The incorrect precedent eBay now stands for at district 
courts can be explained through the case facts and procedure as 
well. First, and potentially foremost, the parties were before a 
district court judge who was decidedly anti-patent owner—every 
single patent case before Judge Friedman was decided against 
the patent owner.262 MercExchange may have actually been the 
most-favored patentee in Judge Friedman’s courtroom in that 
they were the only patent owner to actually go to trial on a 
patent. Further to the anti-patent lean is that Judge Friedman 
was an early follower of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as 
precedent263 and was later widely cited in his incorrect following 
of that precedent.264  
In defense of Judge Friedman, but likely another unique 
factor in the case history, is the harm an injunction, or injunction 
denial, may have inflicted on each party. As discussed supra, and 
argued directly to the Court at oral argument, should Judge 
Friedman have issued an injunction against eBay, the company 
stock price would have fallen, market share in its online business 
 
 259 For a detailed discussion of the importance of clear precedent for lower courts, see 
Berkolow, supra note 234, at 306–14 (“Adherence to the rule of law is critical . . . problems 
arise when subsequent inferior courts are confused.”).  
 260 See supra Part I.C.3. 
 261 Despite Federal Circuit injunction jurisprudence seemingly unchanged due to 
eBay—to be confirmed in a forthcoming study—the outcome at the district court level is 
most important when considering the timing of equitable remedies (immediately after 
trial) and delay in appeals. The drastic decline in injunction grants at the district court 
level underscores the importance of correcting eBay’s precedent given the impact the 
decline has caused. See infra Part IV.C.  
 262 See supra Part II.A.4. Potentially adding to Judge Friedman’s frustrations with 
patentees/patent cases was the contentious nature of this specific litigation between the 
parties and the risk of the case continuing “to go on and on and on.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 156, at 24; see supra Part II.A.1–2. 
 263 See supra Parts II.A.3, III.B. 
 264 See supra Part III.B. 
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would have dropped through loss in functionality, the patent 
would have been taken entirely out of the public marketplace, 
and long-term consumer confidence in eBay would have 
decreased. Further—and as Judge Friedman himself noted in his 
opinion—all that would have had a detrimental impact on the 
entire U.S. economy.265 Should the injunction later be reversed, 
in all likelihood, a majority of that harm to eBay could not have 
also been reversed. Alternatively, should MercExchange’s 
request for injunction be denied, the non-practicing 
MercExchange would simply continue to not practice. Should the 
denial later be reversed, the only perceived harm to 
MercExchange would be a delay in financial profits.266 In short, 
given the scale placed before him, perhaps Judge Friedman 
viewed eBay as too big to fail.  
In final defense of Judge Friedman, but likely another 
unique factor in the case history, is that perhaps MercExchange 
was a worthy patentee to be biased against. As Judge Friedman 
noted in his opinion denying an injunction on remand, 
MercExchange was a company founded by an 
inventor-patent-lawyer, funded by litigation investment hedge 
funds, and potentially engaging in licensing activity “effort to 
placate the court as . . . [opposed to] develop[ing] the #265 
patent.”267 
Further explaining the incorrect case precedent is that the 
timing of the dispute, and anti-patent media attention, likely 
played a role in the public and judicial outcome of what the 
opinion would come to mean.268 Intentionally adding fuel to these 
flames was eBay and its many press releases misdirecting media 
attention on the case procedure, skewing any court’s decision into 
its favor, and attempting to show every procedural step—even 
the Federal Circuit holding its mandate during cert filings—as 
an “eBay win” and “patent holder loss.”269 Perhaps this type of 
public relations behavior is standard practice for large 
corporations, but when the public relations of an unknown 
 
 265 See supra Part II.A.2–3. 
 266 While this reasoning appears rational, it is in direct conflict with the Continental 
Paper Bag case—explicitly affirmed within the eBay opinion—and destructive of United 
States patent law generally.  
 267 See supra Part II.A.3. If there is general policy concern over certain types, or 
owners, of patents, congressional review of the issue is likely better suited to address the 
problem. See William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond 
to this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 235 (2007) (“The Federal Circuit has 
stated that neither the courts nor the Patent Office should deny patent protection because 
an invention violates public policy; instead, only Congress can prohibit patent protection 
for a class of inventions on public policy grounds.”). 
 268 See supra Parts I.C.4, II.A.5, III.C. 
 269 See supra Part III.C. 
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two-person company is forced to defend against a 35,000 person, 
$16 billion per year revenue enterprise that was potentially 
irrationally furthering litigation instead of making a single-case 
economics based settlement decision,270 it can be assumed that 
eBay’s voice ruled. Finally, regarding press matters, not helping 
MercExchange during the time of litigation was the ongoing and 
very public NTP BlackBerry-phone-shutdown matter with a cert 
petition pending during the same Court Term. With very 
similarly situated non-practicing parties, there was much 
anti-troll sentiment circulating throughout the media.271  
Lastly, some of the incorrect precedent may have been 
caused by MercExchange. In the words of MercExchange’s lead 
counsel, “[J]ustice is made by the litigants of a particular case 
and what they consider to be a reasonable result.”272 Should 
MercExchange not have settled before the Federal Circuit had 
opportunity to reverse Judge Friedman a second time, perhaps 
the eBay Supreme Court opinion might be interpreted differently 
based on the Federal Circuit explaining the case, and correcting 
the precedent, as opposed to an anti-patentee district court judge 
having the final word. Indeed, the likely surplus settlement 
amount eBay offered (over the jury’s judgment) before the 
Federal Circuit could rule on Judge Friedman’s second denial of 
the injunction most likely included value in the precedent of 
having Judge Friedman’s denial of the injunction on remand 
being the final opinion in the case. This expansion of allowing 
Judge Friedman’s opinion to be precedential—or at least not 
forever cited as “reversed” by a court of appeals—would only add 
to the “win” and change in precedent eBay public relations 
worked so hard to create. Additionally, perhaps the non-public 
 
 270 See eBay Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks? 
s=EBAY+Key+Statistics. Beyond eBay’s efforts to simply skew media attention in its 
favor, there is evidence of eBay implying that the case was part of a larger plan for 
anti-patent litigation messaging. For example, eBay’s post–verdict description of trial as 
“‘Round One’ of an ongoing battle.” See supra note 25 and accompanying text. While there 
is no way to conduct analysis on eBay’s decisions to litigate so vigorously—and at an 
expense likely greater than the jury’s judgment—based on the press releases and amici 
interest in the case, it can be assumed that there were much larger issues at stake for 
eBay to draw-out litigation. See Donald J. Kochan, Corporate Social Responsibility in a 
Remedy-Seeking Society: A Public Choice Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 413, 450 (2014) 
(discussing rent-seeking by corporate litigation and how extortion like 
techniques/leverage can be used to change the law); see id. (“When faced with a lawsuit or 
the threat of a viable liability claim, it is entirely possible that the judgment value is far 
exceeded by the external effects of the litigation on the corporation and the corporation’s 
own interests in preserving its brand, image, reputation, customer base, investor interest, 
and the like.”). 
 271 See supra Parts I.C.4, II.A.5, III.C. These examples of improper media attention 
on the case draw the conclusion that notable publicly-notorious entities easily become 
precedent-damaging parties within Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 272 Interview with Greg Stillman, supra note 6. 
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litigation settlement amount MercExchange agreed to, if 
negotiated to be public, could have added strength for the 
non-practicing patentee community that one of their own 
actually won the eBay litigation, despite a public injunction not 
issuing. However, given the confidential settlement agreement 
MercExchange signed, for future understanding of the dispute, 
no conclusion can be drawn regarding the value eBay finally 
placed in MercExchange’s patents.273  
C.  Who Has Won and Lost in the eBay Confusion 
The final analysis of eBay precedent concerns a review of the 
true patent marketplace “winners” and “losers” based on how the 
case has been incorrectly interpreted. As another scholar has 
argued, the “eBay ruling further benefits large corporations.”274 
The true winners of the current eBay precedent are “large 
corporations” who can afford the financial risk of willfully 
infringing others’ patents. Since “eBay drastically reduced the 
threat of permanent injunctions over large corporations’ core 
products or services, these corporations now have even less 
financial incentive to license.”275 Regarding the losers in the eBay 
aftermath, scholars have noted “legitimate small entities face a 
difficult battle to win a permanent injunction because . . . [the 
guidelines] provide lower courts with multiple avenues to 
rationalize denying permanent injunctions to legitimate small 
entities.”276 Regarding Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
specifically, one author noted “Justice Kennedy’s 
guidelines . . . [are a] tool [that] effectively grants large companies 
a ‘license’ to willfully steal patented technology.”277 
Looking back at the eBay case facts and procedure before the 
Supreme Court opinion was issued, it’s important to note the 
parties who had concern over the outcome of the litigation. Amici 
briefs filed in favor of eBay included Time Warner, Amazon.com, 
Chevron, Cisco, Google, Shell Oil, VISA, Xerox, and America 
Online—essentially a sampling of the largest companies in the 
United States.278 Some of these companies—Google, Chevron, 
Cisco, Shell, and VISA—even signed on to multiple briefs in favor 
 
 273 Numerous attempts were made to contact eBay’s former chief counsel to discuss 
the MercExchange litigation; no reply was received.  
 274 Tang, supra note 237, at 249. 
 275 Id. at 249–50. 
 276 William R. Everding, “Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose”: The Predicament Legitimate 
Small Entities Face Post eBay and the Essential Role of Willful Infringement in the 
Four-Factor Permanent Injunction Analysis, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189, 205 (2007). 
 277 Id. 
 278 See supra Part I.C.1. 
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of eBay’s position before the Court.279 In contrast, the briefs filed 
on behalf of MercExchange included association groups of much 
smaller entities or individuals, including the American Bar 
Association and the United Inventors Association.280 While this 
Article did not include research regarding the role of other 
companies in the way eBay precedent has been misinterpreted, it 
is telling that like eBay, the desired outcome for these large 
corporate entities was achieved despite the Supreme Court not 
actually adopting their amici-argued positions. While there is 
certainly need for additional research, this correlation in the case 
may be added support for what some scholars have noted as “a 
cog in a grander project of curtailing injunctive relief in 
general.”281  
Regardless of the true reasons for the outcome, the damage 
to the “losers” is becoming increasingly clear. In the words of 
MercExchange’s inventor and founder, Tom Woolston, testifying 
before the Federal Trade Commission after the conclusion of 
litigation in 2009: 
I don’t know how you go out and raise money with a straight face on [] 
technology that is covered by a U.S. patent . . . [when] a faster better 
capitalized competitor is[] going to move into your market . . . . [S]mall 
companies don’t stifle innovation, right. Big companies stifle 
innovation because they’ve got market share and market power and 
they don’t need to innovate to maintain their profit margins so it’s 
always the challenger to the market leader that’s going to be the 
innovator because it has to be better, faster and cheaper . . . .282 
CONCLUSION 
For future precedent, the eBay opinion should be 
remembered, and cited, for what it is—the unanimous opinion. 
This includes affirmance of the Continental Paper Bag case just 
as strongly as a requirement for judges to apply the four-factor 
equitable framework. The unanimous eBay opinion does not 
 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. The exception to this bias is that large patent-intensive companies like 
Qualcomm, General Electric, 3M, and pharmaceutical companies filed briefing on behalf 
of MercExchange. See id. 
 281 Gergen et al., supra note 2, at 205 n.7 (“Those of suspicious mind might contend 
that, regardless of the Supreme Court’s protestations, eBay is a cog in a grander project of 
curtailing injunctive relief in general and possibly injunctive relief in institutional-reform 
and environmental litigation in particular.”). 
 282 Hearing on the Evolving IP Marketplace, supra note 222, at 60–64. Should the 
aftermath of the eBay precedent not change, perhaps this added level of frustration for 
smaller companies is greater reason for new forms of patents or government grants to 
support invention-commercialization for small entities. For a thorough discussion of 
commercialization awards and commercialization patents, see Camilla A. Hrdy, 
Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13 (2015). 
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allow courts to base permanent injunction decisions on broad 
classifications disfavoring patent owners who lack commercial 
activity in practicing their patents. While every case must be 
reviewed individually, the post-eBay 78%–84% drop in post-trial 
permanent injunction grants for patent infringers who are not 
market competitors is a broad abuse of eBay practice that needs 
to be further analyzed and potentially contained.  
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